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Our earlier study in this Review examined three years of federal
constitutional tort litigation in the Central District of California.' It
sketched the perceptions that dominate public and professional de-
bate about constitutional tort litigation 2 and included several find-
I Eisenberg & Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 641 (1987). Constitutional tort litigation consists of civil actions brought against
state and local officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) and civil actions brought against
federal officials based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
2 In Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 1, at 646-50, we documented judicial percep-
tions about the negative effect of the perceived flood of constitutional tort cases. Debate
regarding this issue continues. In Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987), the
Court held that an agreement to drop charges against an arrestee in exchange for the
arrestee's agreement to release any claims he might have against a city or its officers is
not, under all circumstances, void as against public policy. One analysis of Rumery treats
it in part as a reaction against a perceived flood of constitutional tort cases. The Supreme
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ings questioning and explaining those perceptions: the national
decline from 1975 to 1984 in civil rights filings as a percentage of
the federal civil docket,3 the lower success rates and generally
greater burden of constitutional tort litigation compared with other
civil litigation,4 the few successful constitutional tort actions per
capita,5 and the modest direct fiscal drain of constitutional tort
litigation.6
This Article has two purposes. The first, pursued in Parts I and
II, is to report the results of a study of constitutional tort litigation
in two other districts, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the
Northern District of Georgia, that replicates the California study.
The study covers one of the same time periods as the California
study, a fiscal 1980-81 year,7 and, for most purposes, presents re-
sults aggregated across the three districts.8
Briefly, the aggregate findings confirm most of the earlier Cali-
fornia study's major findings. Constitutional tort cases are less nu-
merous than popular perceptions suggest. A much smaller fraction
of constitutional tort plaintiffs prevail-either by settling or winning
a court judgment-than do other civil plaintiffs. Court awards of
attorney fees in constitutional tort cases are surprisingly infrequent
and, as a percentage of cases filed, courts award them no more often
than in other cases. Courts do award fees, however, in a higher per-
Court 1986 Term-Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REv. 119, 311-20 (1987); see also Blum,
Lawsuits Put Strain on City Budgets, Nat'l L.J., May 16, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
s Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 1, at 658-68.
4 Id- at 671-8 1.
5 Id. at 681-83.
6 Id. at 684-88. Eisenberg & Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 596 (1988), uses the same field data as this study to assess the number and nature
of actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
7 The earlier California study covered cases filed in calendar years 1975 and 1976.
Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 1, at 657.
8 Together, these districts include, for 1980-81, 8.1% of all federal nonbankruptcy
civil filings, 7.9% of all nonprisoner civil rights filings, and 5.1%o of all prisoner civil
rights filings. The districts also include 8.7%6 of the 1980 United States population.
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTIcs DURING
THE TWELVE MONTH PERIOD ENDED DEC. 31, 1981, at A-8 to A-I1 [hereinafter FEDERAL
JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICs]. These figures are for a year slightly different than that
used in the field portion of this study. The relatively low percentage of prisoner civil
rights filings represented by the three districts is in part a consequence of the concentra-
tion of prisoner civil rights filings in a few districts. For example, the Eastern District of
Virginia and the Middle District of Florida had, respectively, 7.6% and 5.7% of all pris-
oner civil rights filings for the period. Id. The Administrative Office of U.S. Courts,
using preliminary census data, reported the 1980 population of the three districts to be:
11,950,211 (Central District of California), 5,017,194 (Eastern District of Pennsylvania),
2,985,912 (Northern District of Georgia). Id- at A-92. The combined population figure
for the three districts is 19,863,317. The same data show the total U.S. population to be
229,910,565. Other reports of census data differ slightly from these figures.
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centage of successful constitutional tort cases than in other success-
ful cases.
We can refine some of our prior findings in light of the new
larger study. The earlier study suggests that the average constitu-
tional tort action imposes a greater burden on the courts than other
cases impose.9 The new study highlights the importance of distin-
guishing between the average prisoner and nonprisoner constitu-
tional tort action when assessing this burden. Although the typical
nonprisoner constitutional tort action is more burdensome than
other civil actions, the typical prisoner constitutional tort action is
less burdensome. The larger sample also permits deeper explora-
tion of constitutional tort litigation in which attorneys represent
prisoners. It reveals that counselled prisoner constitutional tort
cases are virtually indistinguishable in success rates and other major
characteristics from nonprisoner constitutional tort actions.
Our second goal, pursued in Parts III through V, is to explain
the findings. The findings suggest that a distinctive feature of con-
stitutional tort actions-their challenge to government or official be-
havior-may contribute to plaintiffs' low success rates, though
further study is needed. The findings also question both some as-
sumed effects of the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Award Act of
1976,10 andJudge Posner's assumption of a working market satisfy-
ing prisoners' needs for attorneys. 1 Examining the actors and their
incentives generates implications beyond the constitutional tort
context. The analysis based on these findings provides new insights
into the influence of attorney fees statutes on litigation, the market
for attorneys, and the government as defendant.
The study provides neither a comprehensive picture of the bur-
den and impact of constitutional tort litigation nor a normative as-
sessment of the level of constitutional tort activity. Important
omissions include the full impact of institutional litigation, often
cast as constitutional tort actions, and the full measure of defense
costs. With respect to normative matters, the study does not ex-
amine the optimal level of constitutional tort litigation or its effect
on social welfare.
A preliminary word on data sources is helpful in interpreting
the results that follow. The data come from three primary sources:
(1) national statistics from 1975 to 1984 published by the Adminis-
trative Office; (2) unpublished Administrative Office termination
and filing data covering the same period furnished to us on com-
puter tapes; and (3) data gathered by reading case files of constitu-
9 Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 1, at 671-76.
10 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
11 See infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
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tional tort cases and a control group of non-civil-rights cases in the
three studied districts. Where the tables that follow do not indicate
a source, the findings are based on our field data.' 2
I
THE NUMBER OF CONsTITrUToNAL TORT CASES
Data gathered by the Administrative Office do not identify con-
stitutional tort litigation as a separate lawsuit category. The Ad-
ministrative Office's civil rights categories do contain nearly all
possible constitutional tort actions but these categories also contain
cases other than constitutional tort actions. The Administrative Of-
fice data therefore supply a list of cases that, when culled, can be
used to identify constitutional tort actions.' 3
In 1980-81 litigants filed 1,241 nonprisoner civil rights cases in
the three districts studied. The Administrative Office data on civil
rights categories show the following breakdown of these cases:
Administrative
Office Code Name of Category Number of Cases
440 Other Civil Rights 660
441 Voting 8
442 Jobs 536
443 Accommodations 23
444 Welfare 14
The data also show 727 prisoner civil rights filings, for a total of
1,968 possible constitutional tort cases. Several factors, including
double counting, transferred cases, and miscategorization, reduce
the number of possible constitutional tort filings to 1,858.14 Our
assistants located full or partial data on 1,837 of these cases (about
12 For further discussion of data sources, see Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 1, at
657-58.
13 The study used such a list to identify constitutional tort cases through a field
inspection of court records. See Id. at 652-55.
14 The Administrative Office data list 19 cases twice, leaving 1,949 possible cases.
Forty-eight cases on the lists were not filed in or transferred to the three districts during
the fiscal year studied, leaving 1,901 cases. These are cases formerly suspended for
statistical purposes but reinstated for statistical purposes after being revived. See ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICES AND PROCEDURES transmittal
64, vol. XI, at 11-13 (Mar. 1, 1985) [hereinafter A.O. GUIDE]. Courts transferred 45
cases to other districts before substantial activity occurred in the studied districts, and
six cases were bankruptcy cases miscategorized as civil rights cases, leaving 1,850 cases.
We add to this eight civil rights cases that the Administrative Office data do not catego-
rize as civil rights cases and therefore failed to include on the civil rights case list, which
we discovered when compiling our control sample of non-civil-rights cases.
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99%). 15
Table I shows that 49.2% of the Administrative Office's non-
prisoner "civil rights" cases are constitutional tort cases and that
89.0% of the Administrative Office's "prisoner civil rights" cases
are constitutional tort cases. Combining the prisoner and non-
prisoner categories, 64.1% of the civil rights cases are constitutional
tort cases. The rest are actions based on various other statutes, the
largest number being title VII 6 employment discrimination cases.' 7
Many constitutional tort cases are employment discrimination
claims against a government that also include a title VII allegation. 18
Because of the lower burden of proof in some title VII cases,' 9 such
hybrid cases probably are driven by the title VII claim and should
therefore be excluded from the constitutional tort category. Ex-
cluding these 60 cases from the 582 constitutional tort cases leaves
522 (or 44% of the Administrative Office civil rights cases) "pure"
nonprisoner constitutional tort cases or 1,151 (61%) prisoner and
nonprisoner constitutional tort cases filed in the three districts in
1980-81. This figure could be further reduced by the 61 cases in
which plaintiffs erroneously relied on section 1983,20 leaving 461
15 Partial data from docket sheets and/or Administrative Office computer tapes
were used in 122 cases. We treat consolidated cases as single actions represented by the
case into which they were consolidated. Thus, the total number of cases reported in
some tables is less than the total number of cases with respect to which data were found.
To avoid possibly understating the number of constitutional tort cases, this study
counts a case as a constitutional tort case whenever a plaintiff relies on § 1983 in the
complaint or when, even if plaintiff does not mention § 1983, the action probably should
be treated as a constitutional tort action. This occurs when a plaintiff sues a federal
official claiming a violation of constitutional rights, a situation not covered by § 1983.
The Supreme Court has held that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear such claims.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
390-94 (1971). Plaintiffs are not required to cite Bivens in their complaint. See Mullis v.
United States Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1987) (characterizing
action filed under § 1983 as a Bivens action); Connor v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.,
No. 87-3054 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 1988) (available on Westlaw, 1988 WL 34255) (presum-
ing Bivens action).
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
17 The 1,890 figure in the left-hand column of Table I differs from the 1,858 figure
in the text due to (1) the inclusion in Table I of cases transferred into the three districts
and bankruptcy cases, (2) the exclusion of civil rights cases not appearing on the Admin-
istrative Office list, and (3) the exclusion of one case not appearing on the Administra-
tive Office's original civil rights case list furnished to us.
18 For a statement that many Bivens actions also include job-related claims, see Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act: Hearings on S. 1775 Before the Subcomm. on Agency Administration of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (statement ofJ. Paul McGrath,
Assistant Attorney General).
19 Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (upholding disparate
impact standard for title VII) with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (discrimina-
tion claims under constitution require showing of discriminatory intent).
20 For purposes of this study we deem reliance on § 1983 to be erroneous when
plaintiff neither alleges government action nor names a government actor as a defend-
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TABLE I
NUMBER OF CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CASES, 3 DISTRICTS, 1980-81
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE DATA COMPARED WITH FIELD DATA
Constitutional Tort Cases
Administrative No. of Cases Number 7 of Admin.
Office Label (Code) (Admin. Off.) Found Off. Number
Other Civil Rights (440) 631 467 74.07o
Voting (441) 8 5 62.5%
Jobs (442) 509 95 18.7%o
Accommodations (443) 22 6 27.3%o
Welfare (444) 13 9 69.2%
Subtotal
Nonprisoner 1183 582 49.2%o
Prisoner Civil Rts. (550) 707 629 89.0%
COLUMN TOTAL 1890 1211 64.1%
(39% of the Administrative Office civil rights cases) true non-
prisoner cases and 1,090 (58%) cases in the combined category. In
comparison, plaintiffs filed 3,406 non-civil-rights tort cases in the
three districts during 1980-81.21
Using the above figures, each of the 47 judges in the three dis-
tricts 22 received about two constitutional tort filings per month.23
To put this figure in perspective, in 1980-81 civil filings in the three
districts totaled 14,989.24 The nonprisoner constitutional tort fil-
ings thus comprised about three percent of the districts' civil
caseload, and the combined prisoner and nonprisoner constitu-
tional tort filings comprised approximately seven percent.25
ant. This understates erroneous reliance because it accepts cases in which plaintiff
names an official actor as defendant but fails to allege a constitutional violation.
21 The tort case filing figure is from the Administrative Office computer tapes.
22 For fiscal 1981, the Central District of California had 17 judgeships, the North-
ern District of Georgia had 11, and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had 19. ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR UNITED STATES COURTS 1981,
at 33, 55, 105.
23 This figure includes the many prisoner constitutional tort actions that are quickly
dismissed.
24 This figure is based on Administrative Office tapes for cases filed in the three
districts from October 1, 1980, to September 30, 1981. The tapes show 15,075 cases,
but 86 are listed more than once.
25 The fraction of the docket consisting of constitutional tort cases in the three
districts under study here is somewhat below the national average unless in the three
studied districts actual constitutional tort cases constitute an unusually high proportion
of cases in the Administrative Office's civil rights category. See supra note 8 and accom-
panying text. If one discounts the nationwide Administrative Office data by the percent-
ages in the last column of Table I, then in fiscal 1980-81 nonprisoner constitutional tort
cases comprised 8.9% of the nationwide federal docket, and prisoner constitutional tort
cases comprised an additional 17%. The figures to which the Table's percentages are
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
II
CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL TORT LITIGATION
A. The Success of Constitutional Tort Litigants
1. Defining Success
Our field data and the Administrative Office data provide meas-
ures of both the absolute and the relative success of constitutional
tort cases. Before presenting the results, however, some discussion
of the meaning of "success" is in order. There are several plausible
definitions of a successful case. They range from purely economic
analyses of investment in and return from a lawsuit to more subjec-
tive approaches. 26 Limited to courthouse records, however, we em-
ploy more pedistrian measures of success.
As perhaps the most obvious measure of success, we determine
the percentage of cases in which the plaintiff obtained a favorable
court judgment. Even here, however, there is room to interpret
whether a case succeeded. Juries may award nominal or other dam-
ages that are trivial in comparison to the amount the plaintiff ex-
pended in the litigation. Full assessment of such a case would deem
it unsuccessful even though the plaintiff was victorious at trial and
the keepers of statistics must record the victory in plaintiff's column.
A truer measure of success might compare the magnitude of plain-
tiffs' recoveries to their investments in the litigation.27
We do not limit ourselves to court judgments, however, be-
cause doing so ignores the many cases that the parties settle pri-
vately. 28 We thus estimate the percentage of cases that settle and
count these as successful as well. Of course, many settlements re-
applied appear in ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR, at 366-68 table C2.
26 For example, a prisoner who sues because a guard has been beating him may be
"successful" if the action deters the guard from beating prisoners, even though the pris-
oner received no economic recovery. See Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 1, at 676-77.
See generally H. Kritzer, A. Sarat, D. Trubek, & W. Felstiner, Winners and Losers in Liti-
gation: Does Anyone Come Out Ahead? (paper presented at Annual Meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Ass'n, Apr. 18-20, 1985) (noting ambiguity of concepts "win-
ning" and "losing" civil litigation).
27 See Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation,
31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 114-15 (1983) [hereinafter Trubek] (providing an analysis of "Net
Recovery/Stakes" ratios). Available proxies for true success are considerably more
blunt. Most empirical studies examining the success rate of plaintiffs at trial, e.g., Bax-
ter, The Political Economy of Antitrust, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST: PRINCI-
PAL PAPER BY WILLIAM BAXTER 3 (R. Tollison ed. 1980); Priest & Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984), count as victories any case in which the
plaintiff prevails at trial. Over large numbers of cases, and without information about
amounts of recoveries in individual cases, it is a valid simplifying assumption that trials
won by plaintiffs are net victories for plaintiffs.
28 See e.g., H. Ross, SETrLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 136 (2d ed. 1980); Trubek, supra note 27, at 86.
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suit in de minimis or disproportionately small payments to plaintiffs
compared with their investment. But, given the insufficient detail
about most individual settlements, we probably distort reality less
by assuming that plaintiffs succeed in settled cases than by assuming
they do not succeed. To obtain a fuller picture of constitutional tort
litigation, it is preferable to account for differences in settlement
patterns as well as trial outcomes. 29
Under our broad measure of success, then, a successful case is
any one in which (1) the plaintiff wins after trial or on summary
judgment, (2) the parties settle, (3) the court grants a stipulated dis-
missal, or (4) the plaintiff dismisses the case voluntarily. Under our
broad definition a case is unsuccessful only if the court dismisses the
claim on the merits or for lack of prosecution, or if the plaintiff re-
ceives an adverse verdict after a bench or jury trial30
The intuition driving this broad definition is that plaintiffs who
go to the trouble of commencing lawsuits do not usually settle them
or voluntarily withdraw them without gaining something in return.
This can be true even if the action is filed without a serious intention
of pursuing it to trial.31 For example, if the mere filing of a lawsuit
changes the defendant's practices (e.g., the defendant guard no
longer beats a prisoner), the plaintiff might withdraw the action. A
further justification for using a broad measure of success is that,
when testing the impression of burden and fiscal drain of constitu-
tional tort litigation, it is important not to understate its success
rate.
The broad definition of success misclassifies cases filed and
later settled or withdrawn in which the plaintiff receives nothing.
This probably occurs infrequently in settled cases, by far the largest
category of cases with unclear resolutions. But the plaintiff who files
an action to test who the judge might be, or who files to satisfy some
psychological need to file, or who files because filing is about as in-
teresting as anything else the plaintiff has to do, may file a case and
withdraw it. These cases ought not count as having succeeded.32
Counting them as successful probably distorts the prisoner results
29 Trubek, supra note 27, at 83.
30 For an estimate of the magnitude of the overstatement this definition of success
introduces, see Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 1, at 683-84.
31 H. Ross, supra note 28, at 215-16.
32 Even though here, too, some of these plaintiffs got what they wanted. They just
did not want very much more than to file the action. Professor Galanter effectively mar-
shals studies suggesting that, in general, "litigants do not act as if propelled by an unap-
peasable appetite for contest or public vindication," and that litigants find litigation an
unpleasant experience. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3,
8-9 (1986).
1988] 727
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(by overstating success) more than it distorts the nonprisoner
results.
The control group ensures that constitutional tort plaintiffs'
success rates are not overly distorted. For many purposes, one need
only focus on the success rate of constitutional tort cases relative to
the success rate of other cases. The randomly selected control
group's success rate provides a baseline for such comparative pur-
poses even if it, too, overstates success rates.
2. The Data on Success
Table II presents Administrative Office data relating to success
for the Administrative Office categories of cases called "other civil
rights" and "prisoner civil rights," the categories that most nearly
correspond to constitutional tort litigation. The Administrative Of-
fice data, displayed in Table II, suggest that constitutional tort
plaintiffs do significantly worse than non-civil-rights litigants. Table
II shows that constitutional tort plaintiffs prevailed in 59 out of 468
(12.6%) cases in which the district court clerks report an outcome in
favor of a plaintiff or a defendant. This figure rises to 22.1% (48 of
217 cases) if one limits the sample to nonprisoner cases. In non-
civil-rights cases, plaintiffs were reportedly successful in 2,979 out
of 4,069 cases (73.2%). If one excludes cases resulting in default
judgments, non-civil-rights plaintiffs still prevail in 1,394 of 2,475
cases (56.3%).33
TABLE II
PARTY OBTAINING JUDGMENT IN POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL TORT
CASES COMPARED WITH NON-CIVIL-RIGHTS CASES
Source: Administrative Office Data, 3 Districts, 1980-81
Possible
Constitutional Non-civil- Non-prisoner Non-civil-rts.
Tort3 4 Cases rights Constit. Tort Without Defaults
Plaintiff 59 2979 48 1394
12.6% 73.2% 22.1% 56.3%
Defendant 409 1090 169 1081
87.4% 26.8% 77.9% 43.71%
COLUMN TOTAL 468 4069 217 2475
33 Examining cases by what the Administrative Office labels "disposition," see A.O.
GUIDE, supra note 14, at 11-24 to 11-26, and again limiting the analysis to cases showing a
prevailing party, the same pattern emerges. In cases disposed of by motion before trial,
described in id. at 11-25, 11-26, constitutional tort plaintiffs prevailed in 8% of the cases
while non-civil-rights plaintiffs prevailed in 40% of the cases. In cases disposed of by
jury trial, constitutional tort plaintiffs prevailed in 18% of the cases and non-civil-rights
plaintiffs prevailed in 49% of the cases. In cases disposed of by the court during or after
trial, constitutional tort plaintiffs prevailed in a much lower percentage of the cases.
Similar results emerge when one examines nonprisoner constitutional tort cases
separately.
34 Possible constitutional tort cases are those in the Administrative Office category
"other civil rights" (code 440) and "prisoner civil rights" (code 550). See supra Table I.
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Applying our definition of success to our field data confirms the
relative failure of constitutional tort litigants. One can be more con-
fident about the results from the field data than from the Adminis-
trative Office Data because only cases determined to be
constitutional tort cases are treated as such in the field data. As
noted above,35 the Administrative Office categories do not cut finely
enough to assure this.
According to the field data, nonprisoner constitutional tort
plaintiffs succeeded (i.e., settled or received a favorable court judg-
ment) in 50% of the cases filed. Control group plaintiffs succeeded
in 84% of the cases they filed. 36 Most of these successes are not the
result of favorable court judgments. For nonprisoners, 45% of the
cases are settled, withdrawn, or given a stipulated dismissal, while
only 5% obtain a favorable court judgment.3 7 For prisoners, 17%
of the cases are settled, withdrawn, or given a stipulated dismissal,
while only 1% (a total of 7 cases) obtain favorable court judgment.3 8
Our sample of non-civil-rights cases indicates that 73% of the cases
35 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
36 See infra Table IV ("success" row, nonprisoner column). Whatever the short-
comings of our definition of success, our control group success rate is consistent with
the rates observed by scholars in other types of cases. In personal injury tort cases and
medical malpractice actions, for example, scholars report that plaintiffs obtain some
amount through settlement or trial in over 80% of the cases filed. A. CONARD, J. MOR-
GAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS:
STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION 155-56 (1964); H. Ross, supra note
28, at 217; Danzon & Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice
Claims, 12J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 365 (1983); Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money, and
the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10-11,
13-14 (1961); Schwartz & Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-
Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1155 n.45 (1970). In a study of ten courts, 88%
of the cases settled. D. TRUBEK, J. GROSSMAN, W. FELSTINER, H. KRITZER & A. SARAT,
CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL REPORT, PART A, at 11-82 (1983) [hereinafter
CLRP]. In antitrust cases, many commentators emphasize the poor success rate in adju-
dicated disputes. But their data also suggest some success, through settlement or other-
wise, in the 75% to 80% range. See Baxter, supra note 27, at 16, 17 table 1-1; Perloff &
Rubinfeld, Settlements in Private Antitrust Litigation, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 149,
163 (L. White ed. 1988) [hereinafter PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION]; Salop & White,
Private Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction and Framework, in id. at 3, 10-11. In class and
derivative actions, the success rate infiled disputes is close to the 80% figure. SeeJones,
An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Suits, 60
B.U.L. REV. 542, 545 (1980) (75.3% of suits led to some recovery). But see F. WOOD,
SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING DERIVATIVE SUITS 32 (1944), as reported in Conard, A
Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972 DUKE LJ. 895, 901 n.21 (lower
success rate in filed cases).
37 See infra Table IV. One can look within court judgments to the success of plain-
tiffs at trial. Control group plaintiffs prevailed in 27 of 48 (56.3%) trials. Nonprisoner
constitutional tort plaintiffs prevailed in 17 of 62 (27.4%) trials, while prisoner constitu-
tional tort plaintiffs prevailed in 5 of 27 (18.5%) trials. The differences between the
control group trial success rate and both categories of constitutional tort litigation are
significant at the .01 level. See infra note 52.
38 Id.
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are settled, withdrawn, or given a stipulated dismissal, and plaintiffs
obtain a favorable court judgment in an additional 11% of the
cases.3 9 Constitutional tort plaintiffs also obtained a money judg-
ment or money settlement in a significantly lower percentage of
cases than other plaintiffs did.40
Computing an upper limit on the number of successful consti-
tutional tort actions provides one insight into the constitutional tort
litigation problem. Nonprisoner constitutional tort cases succeed
about half the time.41 Prisoner constitutional tort cases succeed
about 18% of the time.42 Under our broad definition of success, not
more than 364 constitutional tort cases achieved some success 43 in
1980-81 in the three districts. The 1980 census shows that the three
districts had a population of 19.86 million.44 Thus, not more than
one person in 54,000 brought a successful constitutional tort case in
1980-81.
39 Id.
40 See infra Table IV. The field data allow control for an important factor, represen-
tation by counsel, not included in the Administrative Office data. Prisoner constitutional
tort plaintiffs obtain counsel in 20% of the filed cases. (The aggregate three-district
figure is misleading here. See infra text accompanying notes 198-200.) Counsel repre-
sent nonprisoner constitutional tort plaintiffs in about 87% of the filed cases. Non-civil-
rights litigants have counsel 98% of the time. Counselled plaintiffs ought to have higher
success rates both because of greater litigation skills and because counsel may refuse to
bring the weaker constitutional tort cases. Cf H. Ross, supra note 28, at 193-98 (in
bodily injury claims, representation by counsel is major influence on outcome). But less
frequent representation by counsel can explain only a small part of the lower success
rates of constitutional tort plaintiffs. Controlling for the presence of counsel, significant
differences remain between the rate of recoveries by constitutional tort plaintiffs and
others. This is true even if one screens out default judgment cases and ignores all pris-
oner cases.
41 See infra Table IV. This is similar to the result obtained earlier for a single dis-
trict. See Eisenberg & Schwab,.supra note 1, at 682 (success rates for counseled constitu-
tional tort cases is about one-half).
42 We suspect that this overstates prisoner success rates. An independent study of
prisoner civil rights suits suggests extremely low prisoner success rates. Contact Center,
Inc. surveyed 33 state correction systems and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Using data
mostly for the years 1983 and 1984, the systems reported on suits lost or settled result-
ing in monetary damages to an inmate, and suits lost or settled in which an inmate's
attorney was awarded fees. For the 34 jurisdictions during the two-year period, depart-
ments reported 91 monetary damages suits lost, 159 monetary damages suits settled,
and 56 suits in which attorney fees were awarded. CONTACT CENTER, INC., INMATE LAW-
surrs (1985) [hereinafter CONTACT CENTER]. The inmate lawsuits study may understate
prisoner success rates. See Letter to Gary Hill (of Contact Center, Inc.) from Jim
Thomas, Northern Illinois University Department of Sociology (questioning methodol-
ogy and data) (Apr. 4, 1986) (on file at Cornell Law Review). It should also be noted that
the study did not receive data from several states with large prison populations, includ-
ing California, Florida, New York, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia.
43 Table IV's percentages are based on 108 prisoner cases that were settled, volun-
tarily dismissed, or withdrawn and 7 that obtained a favorable court judgment, and 229
nonprisoner cases that were settled, voluntarily dismissed, or withdrawn and 23 that
obtained a favorable judgment.
44 See supra note 8.
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B. The Relative Burden of Constitutional Tort Litigation
As explained in our earlier work, time to disposition, proce-
dural progress, and litigation activity can be used to assess the rela-
tive burdens imposed by constitutional tort and non-civil-rights
cases. 45 Both our field data and the Administrative Office data sug-
gest that the typical nonprisoner constitutional tort case takes more
judge and lawyer time than the typical non-civil-rights case on the
federal docket. In contrast, the typical prisoner constitutional tort
case takes about the same time as a non-civil-rights case and is less
burdensome in other respects.
1. Time to Disposition
Table III shows that nonprisoner constitutional tort cases take
longer to resolve than contested control group cases. The median
disposition time of 11.2 months for nonprisoner constitutional tort
cases exceeds the 9.2 month median for the control group. Addi-
tionally, a greater proportion of nonprisoner constitutional tort
cases survive at the end of each of four six-month intervals.
Prisoner constitutional tort cases present a less clear pattern. A
lower percentage of prisoner cases than control group cases survive
at the end of six months, but a greater percentage survive at the end
of eighteen months and twenty-four months. Thus, relatively many
prisoner cases end quickly, but the remaining cases take longer, on
average, to dispose of than non-civil-rights cases. Prisoner cases
have a lower median time to disposition than control group cases.
More sophisticated analysis of the case survival patterns con-
firms the differences in survival rates. Survival analysis examines the
time separating the starting date (filing a case) and ending date (ter-
minating a case) of a given sample and allows statistical comparisons
of the survival distributions for two independently drawn samples. 46
The probability that our samples would be this different if the non-
prisoner constitutional tort and control group populations had the
same cumulative survival distributions is only .0004.4 7 Further-
more, a greater percentage of constitutional tort cases remain pend-
ing at the end of the study, five years after filing. For prisoner
constitutional tort cases, the probability of a cumulative survival dis-
45 Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 1, at 671-75.
46 Grossman, Kritzer, Bumiller & McDougal, Measuring the Pace of Civil Litigation in
Federal and State Trial Courts, 65 JUDICATURE 86, 95-96 (1981).
47 The traditional threshold for statistical significance is .05. We thus reject the
null hypothesis that constitutional tort cases and non-civil-rights cases have the same
cumulative survival distributions. The .0004 probability is based on a Lee-Desu statistic
of 12.435 with one degree of freedom. For a discussion of the Lee-Desu statistic, see
Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 1, at 672 n.139.
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TABLE III
COMPARATIVE SURVIVAL LIFE TABLE CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CASES
VS. CONTROL GROUP, 3 DISTRICTS, 1980-81
Cumulative proportion of cases surviving to end of interval
Interval Start Time Constitutional Control Group-weighted Constit. Tort
Tort (prisoner) (excluding defaults) (nonprisoner)
6 months 54% 62% 68%
12 months 35% 35% 46%
18 months 24% 22% 30%
24 months 15% 13% 21%
10% of cases remain 33 mos. 27 mos. 36 mos.
Median survival time 8.2 mos. 9.2 mos. 11.2 mos.
Number of Cases 629 649 520
Pending as of 1.0% 0.3% 1.5%
August 1986
tribution similar to the control group is .013, with prisoner cases
showing a faster termination rate.48 Administrative Office data also
suggest that nonprisoner constitutional tort cases last longer than
other cases. 49
2. Litigation Activity
Table IV presents other comparisons between constitutional
tort cases and the control group of non-civil-rights cases. The con-
stitutional tort columns 50 show the percentage of both prisoner con-
stitutional tort cases and nonprisoner constitutional tort cases for
each relevant characteristic. The control group column shows the
percentage of cases with the relevant characteristic for all control
group cases that did not result in default judgments. The three col-
umns allow separate comparisons of both the prisoner cases and the
nonprisoner cases with the control group. They also permit (1)
comparisons that avoid overstating the control group cases' success
because of the uniformly successful default judgment cases, 5 1 and
(2) comparisons that avoid understating the constitutional tort
48 This is based on a Lee-Desu statistic of 6.156 with one degree of freedom.
49 Possible nonprisoner constitutional tort cases had a mean disposition time of
12.8 months with a median of 9.7 months. Non-civil-rights cases (excluding default
judgments) had a mean disposition time of 10.8 months and a median of 8.0 months.
Possible prisoner constitutional tort cases had a mean disposition time of 11.6 months
and a median time of 8.2 months. Large standard deviations, all greater than 10
months, make these measures less helpful than a survival distribution for comparing
classes of cases.
50 In Table IV we exclude transferred and pending cases from the constitutional
tort group. For some categories, the total number of cases differs slightly from the
number shown in the "Total Cases" row.
51 In addition to excluding transferred and pending cases, we exclude from the
control group various classes of cases not suitable for comparison with a traditional
plaintiff versus defendant action. The excluded categories are cases involving district
court review of agency action, cases in which the primary issue is removal, bankruptcy
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cases' success because of the highly unsuccessful prisoner civil
rights cases. The two right-hand columns show the degree of statis-
tical significance for the two comparisons.5 2
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF CONSTITUTIONAL TORT & CONTROL GROUP CASES,
3 DISTRICTS, 1980-81
Constit. Control Grp. Constit. Significance
Tort (no defaults) Tort Prisoner Nonpris.
Case Characteristics (prisoner) (weighted) (nonpris.) vs. vs.
Ctrl Grp. Ctrl Grp.
Success5 3  18% 84%. 50% <.001 <.001
by Success in Court 1% 11% 5% <.001 <.001
by Settlement, etc. 17% 73% 45% <.001 <.001
Answer 46% 67% 72% <.001 .135
Interrogatories 20% 29% 38% <.001 <.001
Hearing 9% 17% 39% <.001 <.001
Pretrial Conference 9% 18% 31% <.001 <.001
Depositions 14% 37% 42% <.001 .080
Trial Commenced 5% 10% 15% .002 .006
Production of Documents 10% 17% 23% .002 .012
Discovery Event 26% 46% 53% <.001 .022
Money Judgment 1% 10% 2% <.001 <.001
Money Settlement 1% 7% 4% <.001 .072
Fees Awarded by Court 0% 3% 5% <.001 .315
TOTAL CASES 626 653 509
Our earlier one-district study suggested a clear picture in which
constitutional tort litigation seemed more burdensome than other
civil litigation. 54 That single district understated the role of pris-
oner cases.5 5 Aggregate results for the three districts suggest a
sharper division between prisoner and nonprisoner constitutional
cases, actions reviewing arbitration, cases suspended for statistical purposes, actions to
enforce summonses or quash subpoenas, and forfeiture actions.
52 The significance level is the probability that a result as extreme as the one ob-
served could have occurred if the null hypothesis were true. The null hypothesis is that
there is no difference between the groups being compared with respect to the character-
istic studied in the population from which the cases are drawn. See G. SNEDECOR & W.
COCHRAN, STATISTICAL MEMODS 11 (7th ed. 1980). Could the difference between ob-
served success rates, for example, arise solely from case-to-case variability if the null
hypothesis were true? Id. at 12. Reading from Table IV, the probability is less than .001
that we would observe differences this large if there were no difference in success rates
between nonprisoner constitutional tort cases and control group cases. If the observed
significance level is small enough, usually less than .05 or .01, the null hypothesis is
rejected. Id. at 65. We therefore reject the statement that there is no difference between
success rates.
53 For a discussion of "success," see supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. In
Table IV the control group cases have been weighted because different percentages of
the non-civil-rights case population were sampled in the three districts. The weighting
factors for control group cases are .9070 (C.D. Cal.), 1.7460 (E.D. Pa.), and .6054 (N.D.
Ga.).
54 Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 1, at 672-76.
55 See supra text following note 9.
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tort cases. In nearly all measurable respects, the average non-
prisoner constitutional tort case is more burdensome than the aver-
age case in the control group. Yet the average prisoner
constitutional tort case is distinctly less burdensome.
We first compare nonprisoner constitutional tort cases with the
control group. The average constitutional tort case has more docu-
ments requiring a lawyer's time than does the average non-civil-
rights case. Defendants file answers in constitutional tort cases
somewhat more often than in non-civil-rights cases. Discovery
events56 occur more often in constitutional tort cases than in other
cases. Lawyers in nonprisoner constitutional tort cases take deposi-
tions more often, and file interrogatories significantly more often,
than in other cases.
Isolating prisoner constitutional tort cases presents a different
picture. As Table IV shows, prisoner constitutional tort cases lead
to significantly fewer answers, interrogatories, hearings, deposi-
tions, and trials than other litigation.
Examination of the data also suggests the relative burden of
constitutional tort cases on judges' court time. Judges are signifi-
cantly more likely to conduct a hearing in a nonprisoner constitu-
tional tort case than in a non-civil-rights case. Furthermore judges
are more likely to have a pretrial conference or conduct a trial in a
constitutional tort case. These results remain true even when ignor-
ing default judgments. Prisoner cases again suggest the reverse
pattern.
We conclude that the average nonprisoner constitutional tort
case is more burdensome than the average non-civil-rights case,
while the average prisoner case is less so. 5 7
C. Subgroups of Constitutional Tort Cases
Constitutional tort actions cover such a broad range of behavior
that it is helpful to examine subcategories of such cases. Table V
presents the categories of possible success of nonprisoner constitu-
tional tort cases by subcategory. It suggests that cases brought
against the police 58 are the largest and most successful class of con-
stitutional tort litigation. However, the difference in the overall suc-
cess of cases brought against the police is not statistically significant
when compared with most other categories. The success rate is rel-
56 A discovery event value of "" is assigned to a case if any discovery events have
occurred and a value of "0" is assigned if no discovery events occurred. It thus tests for
any discovery activity rather than for a specific kind of discovery activity.
57 For a study reaching a similar conclusion, see S. FLANDERS, THE 1979 FEDERAL
DIsnuar COURT TIME STUDY 4-6 (Federal Judicial Center 1980).
58 These are false arrest cases, assault cases, and wrongful search and seizure cases.
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atively flat, ranging from 48% to 60% across all major categories of
constitutional tort litigation.
TABLE V
SUCCESS OF NONPRISONER CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CASES BY
SUBGROUP, 3 DISTRICTS, 1980-81
Money Money Fees by Percent
Case Type N Success Judgment Settlement Court Counseled
Police 156 60% 3% 9% 1% 93%.
Employment 83 48% 2% 4% 5% 88%.
Other Discrimination 21 52% 0% 0% 10% 90%0
Due Process 100 49% 2% 2% 6% 89o
Malicious Prosecution 7 43% 0% 0% 0% 71' .
Tax 3 0% 0% 0% 0% 33'
Miscellaneous & Missing 87 33% 3% 0% 3% 68'
1st Amendment 52 54% 2% 4% 13% 98'
Judicial Error 4 0% 0% 0% 0% 50%'o
TOTAL 513 50% 3% 4% 5% 87%
Interestingly, Table V reveals a modest number of nonprisoner
actions against the police, yet constitutional tort actions figure
prominently in the debate about alternative mechanisms for enforc-
ing the fourth amendment. 59 Crude extrapolation from Table V
suggests that nonprisoners annually file roughly 2,000 constitu-
tional tort actions against the police in federal court.60 This must be
a tiny fraction of all contested fourth amendment issues.61 If this
extrapolation accurately depicts the low number of constitutional
tort actions against the police, their possible role as an alternative to
the exclusionary rule needs reevaluation.
Table VI provides data on the procedural progress of non-
prisoner constitutional tort cases by subcategory and permits a com-
parison of constitutional tort case subclasses to see whether any
subclass is especially burdensome. No clear pattern emerges. Ac-
tions against the police generate the highest percentage of answers,
interrogatories, depositions, and document production requests,
but employment cases are close to the same rates in each area. Ad-
ditionally, employment cases, due process cases, and first amend-
ment cases lead to higher rates of hearings.
59 E.g., S. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 372-79 (2d ed. 1984); Pos-
ner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 49, 49-50.
60 The 2,000 figure comes from multiplying 156 by 12.5 and then rounding the
result. It is based on the assumption that the three covered districts comprise about 8%
of federal constitutional tort filings. See supra note 8.
61 One study has suggested that 32.6% of federal criminal defendants who go to
trial contest fourth amendment issues. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS: REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 10 (GD-79-45, Apr. 19, 1979), cited in Posner, supra note
59, at 70 n.52.
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TABLE VI
PROCEDURAL PROGRESS OF NONPRISONER CONSTITUTIONAL TORT
CASES BY SUBGROUP, 3 DISTRICTS, 1980-81
Pretr. Prod.
Kind of Case N Answer Interrog. Hearing Conf. Depos. Trial Docs.
Police 156 85% 53% 30% 39% 60% 21% 32%
Employment 83 83% 52% 46% 42% 59% 22% 24%
Other Discrimination 21 71% 33% 38% 33% 19% 5% 14%
Due Process 100 59% 19% 42% 20% 24% 11% 4%
Malicious Prosecution 7 71% 43% 14% 43% 29% 29% 29%
Tax 3 33% 0% 33% 0% 0% o7 33%
Miscellaneous & Missing 87 55% 28% 40% 22% 29% 10% 20%
Ist Amendment 52 71% 31% 42% 25% 33% 12% 17%
Judicial Error 4 50% 0% 75% 0% 25% 0% 0%
TOTAL 513 72% 38% 38% 31% 42% 15% 23%
D. The Fiscal Consequences of Constitutional Tort Litigation
Our prior work documents the perceived fiscal distress that
constitutional tort litigation causes state and local governments. 62
Three different measures of fiscal burden test this perception. The
first estimates the total amount of dollars, excluding internal litiga-
tion costs, transferred as the direct result of constitutional tort liti-
gation. The second relies on Administrative Office data to contrast
the amounts transferred in constitutional tort litigation with the
amounts transferred in other litigation. The third compares the es-
timated amounts transferred as a result of constitutional tort litiga-
tion with the budgets of the relevant local government entities.
Table VII's summary includes all 70 cases in which the court
records reflect a monetary award (including settlement) or an award
of attorney fees. These constitutional tort cases yield a total recov-
ery, including fees, of about $2 million. One must add to this the
awards achieved through settlements or similar dispositions not re-
flected in court records. Although based on crude calculations, we
estimate recoveries of $4.8 million in these cases. 63 Combining the
62 Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 1, at 650-51.
63 For the Central District of California, relying on a follow-up study addressed to
plaintiffs' attorneys, we estimated that $1.4 million was transferred in the 81 cases with
settlements or other dispositions not reflected in the court records. Id. at 685. Assume
that the same amount, about $17,300, was transferred per case in the other two districts
in the expanded study. (This assumption probably overstates settlement figures in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Georgia. Of cases with
some monetary transfer reflected in the court records, the average transfer was $28,735
in the C.D. Cal. and only $23,451 in the E.D. Pa. and N.D. Ga. One would expect,
therefore, that settlements in the E.D. Pa. and N.D. Ga. would be somewhat less than in
C.D. Cal.) The E.D. Pa. and the N.D. Ga. had a combined total of 196 cases with settle-
ments or similar dispositions not revealed in court records. Then 196 times $17,300 or
$3.4 million changed hands as a result of the unclear E.D. Pa. and N.D. Ga. cases. Ad-
ding this to the $1.4 million dollar figure for the C.D. Cal. yields $4.8 million.
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figures for known and unknown case outcomes produces an "order
of magnitude" estimate on total recoveries, including all settle-
ments, of $6.8 million. Based on the population of the three dis-
tricts, 64 the amount transferred is about 35 cents per person.
TABLE VII
TOTAL AMOUNT RECOVERED:
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CASES WITH CLEAR
DISPOSITION, 3 DISTRICTS, 1980-81
Money judgments $718,511
Settlement 767,077
Fees awarded by court 472,795
Fees by settlement 76,358
TOTAL $2,034,741
To assess the second test of fiscal burden, the relative amounts
transferred as the result of constitutional tort cases versus other
cases, we rely on a figure in the Administrative Office's data. The
Administrative Office's data on terminated cases, which are neces-
sarily sketchy for settled cases, include an item entitled "amount re-
ceived." As described in the Administrative Office's guidelines, this
is the amount awarded by the court and should be reported with the
nature-of-judgment data described above.65 For the three districts
in 1980-81, the Administrative Office data show awards totaling
$358.1 million in cases in which the plaintiff prevailed. 66 Of this
total, $640,000 or .18%o was awarded in cases that might have been
constitutional tort cases. 67
One may also compare the kinds of cases filed against the gov-
ernment. The Administrative Office data identify cases in which the
United States was a defendant. Table VIII compares these constitu-
tional tort cases with other tort cases in which the United States was
a defendant. It thus compares constitutional tort litigation with a
related class of cases, simple tort litigation against a governmental
entity. The table suggests that constitutional tort litigation against
all government entities is less fiscally burdensome than is simple
tort litigation against the United States.
64 See supra note 8.
65 A.O. GUIDE, supra note 14, at 11-26 to 11-27.
66 I. at H-15. The actual figure probably is higher. The Administrative Office's
data scheme only allows for figures up to $9,999,000. The number in the text excludes
default judgments.
67 For an explanation of cases deemed possible constitutional tort cases, see Eisen-
berg & Schwab, supra note 1, at 673 n.140. For a caveat about using the Administrative
Office's monetary data and doubts about its including all amounts transferred as the
result of civil litigation in the three districts, see id. at 686-87.
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TABLE VIII
AMOUNTS RECEIVED IN CONSTITUTIONAL TORT
LITIGATION VS. AMOUNTS RECEIVED IN TORT ACTION
AGAINST THE U.S.
Source: Administrative Office Data, 3 Districts,
1980-81
Possible Constit. Tort Cases in Whi
Tort Cases U.S. is a Defendan
N of cases
Average
Median
TOTAL
21
$ 30,480
8,000
640,000
-h
it
23
$ 77,300
20,000
1,778,000
The third measure of constitutional tort litigation's fiscal drain
compares the amounts transferred in constitutional tort litigation
with the budgets of the relevant government entities. Table IX
presents Census Bureau budget data for the counties comprising
the three districts for the fiscal year closest to the fiscal year covered
by this study. The figures, subject to noted exceptions, "represent a
summation of local government finances within each county unit,
including the county, cities and towns, and school and special
districts." 68
TABLE IX
BUDGET DATA FOR 1980-81 FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
COMPRISING THE THREE DISTRICTS
Source: Bureau of the Census
(dollar amounts in millions)
Central Dist. Calif.69
Eastern Dist. Pa.70
Northern Dist. Ga. 71
TOTAL
General
Revenue
$17,531
5,308
3,546
Expenditures
$19,317
6,488
4,510
$26,385 $30,315
Police
Protection
$1,000
317
146
$1,463
68 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES
IN SELECTED METROPOLITAN AREAS AND LARGE COUNTIES: 1980-81, at 3 [hereinafter Bu-
REAU OF THE CENSUS].
69 See Eisenberg& Schwab, supra note 1, at 685 n.183 for the derivation of the C.D.
Cal. figures. The source Census publication is BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 68,
tables 2 & 5.
70 Data for one E.D. Pa. county include only county data and do not include figures
for other local governmental units.
71 For the N.D. Ga. counties for which we found fiscal data, the general revenues
were $2.357 billion, the expenditures were $2.998 billion and the police protection
budgets were $97 million. The population of these counties totaled 1,984,742. The
figures for the district that appear in the Table are based on the assumption that similar
expenditures and revenues applied for the total district population of 2,985,912.
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Table IX shows aggregate local government revenues of $26.4
billion,72 and aggregate local government expenditures of $30.3 bil-
lion. The estimated $6.8 million transferred as a direct result of
constitutional tort litigation thus represents about .02% of local
government expenditures. Expenditures for police protection, the
line item in the census budget data most closely related to constitu-
tional tort litigation, totalled roughly $1.5 billion. Constitutional
tort litigation payments thus comprised about .46% of local govern-
ment police protection expenditures. 73
Comparing any particular cost to an overall budget can under-
state the significance of that cost. In particular, the costs studied
include only direct transfers from constitutional tort litigation.
They exclude the costs of defending lawsuits, which may be signifi-
candy higher. The comparisons with budget data can, however,
suggest the extent of fiscal relief that local governments might ob-
tain from changes in constitutional tort litigation. The study indi-
cates that even completely abolishing constitutional tort litigation
might not provide substantial fiscal relief to stressed local
governments.
72 The Census Bureau defines "general revenue" as follows:
All revenue of a government except utility revenue, liquor stores reve-
nue, and insurance-trust revenue .... All tax revenue and all intergov-
ernmental revenue even if designated for employee-retirement or local
utility purposes is classified as general revenue.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 68, at 169. The Bureau defines "expenditure" as:
All amounts of money paid out by a government-net of recoveries and
other correcting transactions-other than for retirement of debt, invest-
ment in securities, extension of credit, or as agency transactions. Expen-
diture includes only external transactions of a government and excludes
noncash transactions such as the provision of perquisites or other pay-
ments in kind. Aggregates for groups of governments exclude intergov-
ernmental transactions among the governments involved.
Id. It defines "police protection" as:
Preservation of law and order and traffic safety. Includes police patrols
and communications, crime prevention activities, detention and custody
of persons awaiting trial, traffic safety, vehicular inspection, and the like.
73 These percentages are based exclusively on local governments' budgets. The
constitutional tort recovery amounts include actions against state and federal officials.
Constitutional tort litigation's relative fiscal impact would be substantially reduced if one
included statewide budget data to account for the constitutional tort actions brought
against state officials. A study of prisoner monetary damages litigation found modest
sums transferred as a result of prisoner lawsuits. During the years 1983 and 1984, 34
correction departments transferred to prisoners totals of $2,317,392 in compensatory
damages, $113,196 in punitive damages, $2,713,215 in settlements, and $777,119 in
attorney fees. CONTACT CENTER, supra note 42, at 14.
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III
EXPLAINING CONSTITUTIONAL TORT LITIGATION:
DEVELOPING MODELS
Several findings about constitutional tort litigation stand out.
Under any measure of tangible success, constitutional tort plaintiffs
are less successful than non-civil-rights plaintiffs. The parties settle
fewer constitutional tort cases, and plaintiffs win fewer court judg-
ments. In contested cases brought by counsel, constitutional tort
plaintiffs are successful about one-half the time while non-civil-
rights plaintiffs are successful more than 80% of the time.74 The
rate at which constitutional tort cases are filed relative to other cases
is lower than expected.75 And their relative burden to the judicial
system, though not surprising, also is worth trying to explain.
It is helpful to employ models of litigation to illuminate these
results, and to test explanations against the data. The early dispute
selection models of Professors Gould 76 and Landes77 and Judge
Posner 78 have been expanded by Professor Baxter 79 and Professors
Priest and Klein80 to predict judgment rates in litigated cases.
These works explore which filed actions are likely to be settled and
who will win the cases going to trial.81
Professor Shavell extends the analysis by combining, in a two-
stage decision tree, the decision to file suit with the decision to set-
tle. First, the plaintiff must decide whether to file suit, based on the
expected costs and return from trial. 82 Second, given that the plain-
74 Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 1, at 674 table VIII; supra text accompanying
notes 33-45.
75 Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 1, at 658-71; see supra text accompanying notes
14-25.
76 Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973).
77 Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14J. LAw ECON. 61 (1971).
78 R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 21.5 (3d ed. 1986); Landes & Posner,
Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 235-42 (1979); Posner, An Economic
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 417-20 (1973).
79 Baxter, supra note 27, at 18-21.
80 Priest & Klein, supra note 27, at 6-30.
81 Indeed, one article building on the different expectations model notes that
"[t]he contribution made here lies principally in the distinction drawn between the ques-
tion concerning suit and the subsequent question concerning settlement versus trial."
Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the
Allocation of Legal Costs, I IJ. LEGAL STUD. 55, 55 n.1 (1982).
82 Shavell, supra note 81, at 56-57. Shavell assumes that all plaintiffs filing suit are
willing to go to trial if necessary and do not consider the possible settlement value in the
decision to file an action. But see H. Ross, supra note 28, at 215-16 (filing an action as a
negotiating tactic). Others build on the works of these theorists by positing situations in
which the parties have asymmetric information about the litigation and assessing the
consequences on litigation and settlement decisions. Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement
under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404, 414 (1984); Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial
Negotiation, 18 RAND J. ECON. 198 (1987); P'ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and
Trial, 14 BELLJ. ECON. 539 (1983).
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tiff has filed suit, the parties must decide whether to settle or have
the court decide the case. A model similar to Shavell's may help
probe for empirically testable differences between constitutional
tort litigation and other litigation. Such a two-stage decision model
assumes that parties never settle disputes before filing suit, or that
the only disputes for purposes of the legal system are those generat-
ing a law suit.8 3
Extending the analysis to a three-stage decision tree would ac-
count for the potential plaintiff complaining outside of the court sys-
tem to the defendant, thereby creating a dispute. The parties could
then either resolve the dispute between themselves or the plaintiff
would file a formal lawsuit. Presumably, the decision to resolve the
dispute or file a lawsuit depends on the parties' differing expecta-
tions on the outcome of a formal lawsuit as well as the costs of the
litigation. Once the plaintiff files suit, the parties must make a simi-
lar decision whether to settle the lawsuit or proceed to trial. Profes-
sor Trubek and others, building on the expectations models, used
this approach in their pyramid model of grievance/claim/
disputeAitigation/trial8 4 Such a model accounts for the decision to
file suit and provides a basis for predicting what types of disputes
might have relatively many filings. Testing such models empirically
requires data on the number of disputes outside the courtroom, a
83 Shavell finessed this problem by using an amorphous definition of lawsuit. He
defined "bringing suit" as any action that results in a settlement or trial. See Shavell,
supra note 81, at 56 n.5. He thus combined actual filings leading to settlement or trial
with informal threats leading to settlement (and presumably excludes filings later with-
drawn without settlement from the term "bringing suits"). We define a lawsuit as the
filing of a complaint in district court. Our model therefore eliminates pre-filing discus-
sions with the defendant that resolve the claim. All settlements occur after filing. We
adopt this limitation because pre-filing empirical data are extremely difficult to collect,
and most commentators focus on the number of filings.
84 CLRP, supra note 36, at S-19 (pyramid in which, per 1,000 grievances, 718 lead
to claims, 449 lead to disputes, 103 lead to retention of lawyers, and 50 lead to court
filings); P'ng, supra note 82, at 540-44; Trubek, supra note 27, at 87 (same pyramid as in
CLRP); see also H. Ross, supra note 28, at 136 (19 of 20 automobile injury claims are
disposed of without court action). For studies of the nature of disputes, how they de-
velop, and their relationship to litigation, see Coates & Penrod, Social Psychology and the
Emergence of Disputes, 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 655 (1981); Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emer-
gence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming.... 15 LAw & Soc'y REV.
631 (1981); Kritzer, Studying Disputes: Learningfrom the CLRP Experience, 15 LAW & Soc'y
REV. 503 (1981); Miller & Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary
Culture, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 525 (1981); Trubek, The Construction and Deconstruction of a
Disputes-Focused Approach: An Afterword, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 727 (1981).
The CLRP authors acknowledge the expectations model origins of the model they
use. Trubek, supra note 27, at 76 n.9 (using the term "optimism" model). Further evi-
dence of the model's widespread use in discussion of litigation may be gleaned from
acceptance of its basic tenets in a critical legal studies discussion of litigation. See M.
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 44 (1987). But see Schuck, The Role of
Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 346 n.30
(1986) (anecdotal evidence questioning expectations model).
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vast undertaking.8 5 Lacking such data, we follow Shavell and use a
two-decision model: (1) the plaintiff decides whether to file suit or
forego the claim; and (2) given the lawsuit, the parties together de-
cide whether to settle or have the court decide the lawsuit. 86
1. The Decision to File Suit
Consider a potential plaintiff deciding whether to file suit. The
plaintiff will file suit if the expected recovery from the suit outweighs
the expected costs. Following Shavell, the expected recovery is the
plaintiff's estimate of the amount awarded if the plaintiff wins at
trial, Jp,8 7 discounted by the plaintiff's estimate of the likelihood
that he will win, Pp. The costs, Cp, are all the plaintiff's expected
litigation costs, including the plaintiff's costs of filing, discovery,
lawyers, and the plaintiff's time and aggravation. Assume that the
plaintiff pays for its costs whether it wins or loses the case (the
American rule).8 8 The plaintiff, then, will file suit if and only if
PpJp > Cp. (1)
2. The Decision to Litigate or Settle
Once the plaintiff files the lawsuit, the parties must decide
whether to settle it privately or have the court adjudicate the dis-
pute. Settlements save court costs but are not likely to occur if the
parties differ in their expectations of what the court will do. The
risk-neutral plaintiff will ask in settlement at least the net expected
benefit of a court judgment-otherwise, proceeding to judgment is
preferable. Call the minimum amount the plaintiff will settle for
"A." If the plaintiff's settlement costs are Sp (which we assume to
be less than Cp, the plaintiff's costs of proceeding to judgment),
then
85 See CLRP, supra note 36, at S-17 (surveying 5,000 households to study how fre-
quently disputes lead to litigation); H. Ross, supra note 28, at 20, 136 (many interviews
with adjusters to find that vast majority of automobile insurance claims are resolved
without court action); Trubek, supra note 27, at 85-87.
86 We have no illusion that the models used here come close to capturing the com-
plexity of the factors influencing real-world litigation. As with any model, we hope that
insights gained by the simplifying assumptions inherent in the models provide some
insight into real phenomena.
87 Jp could be a set of expected recoveries, each with its own probability of occur-
ring and its own expected expenses. For example, a plaintiff may estimate an overall
chance of prevailing to be .5. The plaintiff may believe that, if it prevails, there is a .1
chance of recovering $100 and a .9 chance of recovering $500. See Shavell, supra note
81, at 73-74 (viewing expected amount to be recovered as an integral of product of
amount and a probability density function).
88 This assumption changes when examining the effects of the Civil Rights Attorney
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes
94-98.
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A = PpJp - (CP - Sp). (2)
The defendant at this stage must also assess the relative bene-
fits of settlement or court judgment. The defendant will offer as a
settlement figure no more than the expected judgment it must pay
after trial plus its extra costs of proceeding to judgment. Call the
maximum offer of the defendant "B." If Pd is the defendant's esti-
mate that the defendant will lose, Jd is the cost of losing, and Cd and
Sd are the defendant's costs of trial and settlement, respectively,
then
B = PdJd + Cd - Sd- (3)
If B exceeds A, both parties can be better off by settling the
case. We assume that the parties will indeed settle if the defendant
offers more than the minimum the plaintiff is willing to accept.
Thus, the parties will settle if and only if
B>A,
or
C - S > PJp - PdJd, (4)
where C = Cp + Cd (total costs of trial to both parties) and S = Sp
+ Sd (total settlement costs to both parties). Equation (4) states the
familiar result that parties will settle rather than seek judgment from
the court if the costs to the parties of judicial judgment exceed the
difference in the parties' expected return from judicial judgment.8 9
The difference in expected returns has two possible sources. First,
the parties can differ in their predictions of the likely success of the
plaintiff before the court (i.e., the estimates of P can differ). Second,
the parties can have differing stakes in the lawsuit (i.e., Jp differs
from Jd)-
IV
DEVELOPING TESTABLE HYPOTHESES
This skeletal framework provides a structure for explaining the
characteristics-filing rates, litigation rates, rates of judgment for
plaintiffs-of constitutional tort cases. Using the variables in equa-
89 See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 27, at 13 ("litigation will occur only when the expecta-
tions that the parties hold about the probability of outcome or about the magnitude of
the award, or both, differ substantially"). For an interesting alternative model of litiga-
tion, see Cooter, Marks & Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavior, I 1J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982). Their model places greater emphasis on
the influence of the parties' bargaining positions on the outcome of negotiation. Their
predictions of litigation behavior do not differ substantially from the predictions of the
"different expectations" theorists.
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tions (1) and (4), which describe the plaintiff's decision whether to
file a lawsuit and the parties' decision to settle or litigate after plain-
tiff has filed, this Part examines the relationship between a fee-shift-
ing statute and filing rates, litigation rates, and judgment rates. It
then develops possible explanations for these relationships, based
on the nature of the defendant (government or government official)
in constitutional tort cases. As detailed below, this could mean that
the P or J terms in equations (1) and (4) differ between constitu-
tional tort cases and other cases. Part V then tests the hypotheses
developed in this Part.
A. The Influence of Attorney Fees
Two plaintiff-lawyer features may explain constitutional tort liti-
gation's distinctive results.90 First, the fee-shifting rule favoring
plaintiffs9 l separates constitutional tort litigation from the bulk of
contract, tort, and property litigation, all of which are dominated by
the American fee rule. Second, the civil rights lawyer (and client)
may be less motivated by prospects of monetary reward than the
traditional tort lawyer.92 Of course, less concern for money does
90 Ideally, one would separate the goals and incentives of clients and lawyers. Too
much is known about the possible divergence of their interests to assume they can al-
ways be treated as a single actor or that the lawyer is a perfect agent. E.g., Clermont &
Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 529, 534-37 (1978); Coffee,
Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforce-
ment of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 677-84 (1986);
Johnson, Lawyers' Choice: A Theoretical Appraisal of Litigation Investment Decisions, 15 LAw &
Soc'Y REv. 567, 575-77 (1981); Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL
STUD. 189, 193-95 (1987). For the vast majority of litigants, however, a lawyer holds
both the key to the courthouse and a monopoly on the skills necessary to forecast a
favorable outcome for any litigation.
The agency problems that arise in class actions such as shareholder derivative ac-
tions may not occur as commonly in constitutional tort litigation. Few class actions are
filed and fewer are certified. For the three districts in 1980-81, plaintiffs filed 79 consti-
tutional tort class actions and the courts certified 14. These figures include both pris-
oner and nonprisoner filings.
This is not to deny that agency problems can affect civil rights class actions. See
Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litiga-
tion, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 483-95 (1976); Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 1183, 1210-12 (1982); Yeazell, Intervention and the Idea of Litigation: A Commentary on
the Los Angeles School Case, 25 UCLA L. REV. 244, 252-56 (1977).
91 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
92 J. Casper, Lawyers in Defense of Liberty: Lawyers Before the Supreme Court in
Civil Liberties and Civil Rights Cases, 1957-66 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis 1968) [herein-
after J. Casper, Ph.D. thesis] presents an interesting array of reasons given by lawyers
who brought civil liberties cases in the Supreme Court. Id at 1-3, 27-48. These include
(1) being appointed and therefore having no choice, (2) desire for victory, (3) personal
outrage, (4) religious belief, (5) desire to argue before the Supreme Court, and (6) de-
sire for excitement. Further discussion of lawyers' motivations appears in the book that
grew out of Dr. Casper's thesis. J. CASPER, LAWYERS BEFORE THE WARREN COURT (1972)
[hereinafter J. CASPER, WARREN COURT].
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not necessarily translate into a less successful litigation record.
Even publicly spirited counsel or public interest law firms, who may
have less concern with short-term victories than with long-term
goals, have a strong preference for winning. Indeed, achieving the
long-term victories, to a certain extent, requires short-term victo-
ries. Moreover, few entities have their reputations enhanced, or
their budgets increased, by consistently losing.
1. Effect on Filing Rates
Most dispute resolution models assume that lawyers respond to
traditional monetary incentives, such as fees from clients or fee
awards from courts. 93 Holding other factors constant, these models
predict an increase in constitutional tort filings after enactment of
the 1976 Fees Award Act,94 a fee-shifting statute favorable to
plaintiffs. 95
Some cases in which the plaintiff's expected judgment, absent a
fee-shifting rule, would be reduced by attorney fees now become
attractive to plaintiffs. Because the plaintiff is not forced to pay the
victorious defendant's attorney's fees, the plaintiff faces no in-
creased offsetting risk. Therefore, the expected result is an increase
in such cases. One problem with this prediction is that courts some-
times applied a judge-made fee-shifting rule to constitutional tort
cases before 1976.96 Although this might mute the effect of the fees
statute, it should not eliminate it. The nonstatutory rule, unlike the
Fees Award Act, generally required a finding that the successful liti-
gant acted as a "private attorney general."
Equation (1), which describes the plaintiff's economic decision
whether to file suit, demonstrates the prediction of increased filings.
Under a statute that awards fees to prevailing parties, a successful
plaintiff incurs no costs of litigation. This reduces the expected
costs of litigation by the likelihood of success. Under a fee-shifting
statute,97 then, the plaintiff will file suit if
PJp > (1-Pp)CP. 1'
93 If constitutional tort plaintiffs have above-normal amounts of spite, this might
push them toward lower settlement rates. Cooter, Marks, & Mnookin, supra note 89, at
239.
94 See supra notes 10 & 91.
95 R. POSNER, supra note 78, § 21.9, at 538-39; Rowe, Predicting the Effects of Attorney
Fee Shifting, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 139; Shavell, supra note 81, at
74. Professor Katz explores the effect of a shift to the English rule, under which the
losing party pays the winner's legal costs in Katz, Measuring the Demandfor Litigation: Is the
English Rule Really Cheaper?, 3J. LAW EcoN. & ORG. 143 (1987).
96 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975) (ac-
knowledging rule, while rejecting private attorney general theory).
97 References to fee-shifting statutes are to one-way statutes favorable to plaintiffs.
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Because the expected costs of suits are lower than under the
American rule, the plaintiff will file more cases under a fee-shifting
regime.98 Graphing equations 1 and 1', as is done in Figure 1, illus-
trates this result. Disputes have many combinations of possible
plaintiff's judgments (Jp) and likelihood of the plaintiff prevailing as
estimated by the plaintiff (Pp). Figure 1 separates, for a given plain-
tiff's litigation cost, those disputes in which expected recoveries
make filing a lawsuit worthwhile from those disputes not worth fil-
ing. As seen from equation 1', the fee-shifting statute, by allowing
plaintiffs to avoid incurring attorney's fees if they prevail, increases
the proportion of disputes that plaintiffs are willing to bring as law-
suits. The darkly shaded portion of Figure 1 represents those filings
induced by the fee-shifting statute.
CASES SATISFYING FILING CONDITIONS
pre & post fee-shifting statute
20
R
C 16
0
v
SRY
1 12N filed
U
0
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
P - PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS
new cases filed _ cases not tiled pre
fee-shifing Figure I & post fee-shifting
The Shavell-based model employed to predict filing rates obvi-
ously simplifies the plaintiff's real-world decision to file suit. It con-
siders only the expected return rate from suits pursued to trial
discounted by the probability of winning at trial. Thus, it ignores
the possibility that plaintiffs do take into account settlement returns
in theirfiling calculus. Provided, however, that plaintiffs receive at-
98 This assumes that the distribution of disputes in society is unaffected by the fees
statute. Eventually, increased lawsuits might deter governments from creating constitu-
tional tort disputes. With fewer disputes, there may be less litigation even though the
ratio of filings to disputes is increased by the fees statute. Cf R. CoOTER &T. ULEN, LAW
AND ECONOMiCS 481-82 (1988) (suggesting that number of suits is largest when expected
judgment is neither small nor large).
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torney fees awards in settled cases, we doubt that the model's sim-
plifying assumptions distort the predicted effect of a fees statute. A
fees statute should encourage filings even under a more complex
model.
2. Effect on Success Rates
A fee-shifting statute may affect not only the volume of litiga-
tion but also the quality of the claims brought. A fees statute will
encourage both some weak claims (low Pp) and some strong claims
(high Pp) that plaintiffs would not bring absent a fee-shifting rule.
But as seen from Figure 1, the effect is not symmetrical. The fee-
shifting statute has the greatest effect on cases that the plaintiff is
most likely to win (high Pp). Figure 1 suggests that if the distribu-
tion of claims is uniform,99 the fees statute will induce plaintiffs to
file cases with greater chances of obtaining a favorable court
judgment. 100
There is no direct evidence about the distribution of claims, but
Congress probably had some views on the matter when it enacted
the fee-shifting statute. The low-stakes case with a high probability
of success cannot be brought without fee-shifting, yet the
probability of success indicates constitutional rights quite likely have
been violated. Assuming Congress had a less strong interest in fos-
tering long-shot cases with potentially high payoffs,' 0 ' it may be
viewed as having enacted the fee-shifting statute to encourage high-
probability cases where expected costs are high in relation to ex-
pected recoveries. If this assumption is correct, then Congress,
without necessarily studying the distribution of cases not brought
before fee-shifting, might have hoped that post-fee-shifting cases
would show an increased likelihood of success at trial.
3. Effect on Litigation Rates
The dispute resolution model predicts that the pro-plaintiff fee-
shifting statute would increase, among the filed cases, the percent-
age of cases that are litigated through trial rather than settled (the
99 A uniform distribution of disputes in P-J space is a sufficient condition, but not a
necessary condition, for the average P, to rise. As long as the distribution of cases is not
weighted so heavily toward long-shot cases as to counteract the effect discussed in the
text, a fee statute should lead to greater success in judgments. Again, this also assumes
that the fees statute does not alter the distribution of disputes. See supra note 98.
100 For a proof of this statement, see Appendix A to this Article. The increase in
cases brought after enacting a fees statute might deter governments from engaging in
behavior leading to constitutional tort grievances. See supra note 98. This would then
affect the distribution of underlying claims, and may mute the fees statute's long-run
effect.
101 This might depend on why a case is a long shot.
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litigation rate). Professor Shavell states that, subject to qualifying
assumptions, 10 2 the likelihood of trial under a fee-shifting system
favoring the plaintiff is greater than under the American fee rule. 10 3
Fee-shifting results in a greater likelihood of trial because in cases in
which the plaintiff's estimate of the probability of success exceeds
the defendant's, the joint expected legal costs are lower than under
a system with no fee-shifting. 1 4 As equation (4) illustrates, the
lower expected litigation costs reduce the incentive to settle once a
case is filed.
To illustrate, assume that after filing the plaintiff assigns a case
a 90% chance of success (Pp = .9) and the defendant assigns it an
80% chance of plaintiff's success (Pd = .8). The stakes are symmet-
rical (Jp = Jd). The plaintiff then foresees a 10% probability of pay-
ing its own fees, while the defendant anticipates only an 80%
probability of paying the plaintiff's legal fees. Both parties assume
that the defendant will pay its own fees. Accordingly, the plaintiff's
expected legal costs are .1Cp, while the defendant's expected legal
costs are .8Cp + Cd. The sum of the expected legal costs is then .9Cp
+ Cd. Due to the parties' different estimates of plaintiff's likely suc-
cess, the combined expected legal costs is less than when both par-
ties know they will pay their own fees. The lower expected costs
push towards filing over nonfiling, and towards litigation over
settlement.105
In sum, the dispute resolution model predicts that a pro-plain-
tiff fee-shifting statute will increase the number of filings, perhaps
102 Shavell's analysis assumes that the parties do not differ in their estimation of the
size of the likely judgment and his conclusion about the likelihood of trial is conditional
on suit having been brought. Shavell, supra note 81, at 67. If one assumes that the
parties agree about the probability of a judgment for plaintiff but disagree as to the
amount, one model suggests that a fee-shifting statute (or other rule allocating costs)
will not affect the settlement rate. Reinganum & Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and the Allo-
cation of Litigation Costs, 17 RANDJ. EcoN. 557, 562 (1986). But even this model suggests
that cost reallocation (fee-shifting) will affect the settlement rate when the plaintiff keeps
less than the full amount of the settlement. Id. at 562-63.
103 Id. Professors Salop and White agree in the antitrust context. Salop & White,
Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEo. L. REv. 1001, 1026-27 (1986). Pro-
fessor Bebchuk, after taking into account the bargaining process and possible informa-
tional asymmetries, also concludes that a system with a pro-plaintiff rule would lead to
fewer settlements (and more litigated cases) than a system with the American rule.
Bebchuk, supra note 82, at 412. Similarly, in analyzing Rule 68 offers of settlement,
Judge Posner concludes that limiting reimbursement to a prevailing plaintiff will lead to
more litigation than under the American fee rule. R. POSNER, supra note 78, § 21.10, at
542.
104 Plaintiff's expected costs are (1 -P,)Cp. Defendant's expected costs are PdC, +
Cd. Total expected costs are thus (I - P, + Pd)Cp + Cd. When Pp > Pd, total expected
costs are less than total realized costs.
105 R. POSNER, supra note 78, § 21.9; Shavell, supra note 81, at 67.
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raise the probability of plaintiffs' succeeding at trial,10 6 and lower
the settlement rate of filed cases (increase the litigation rate).
B. The Civil Rights Bar
A further possibility why civil rights plaintiffs file relatively un-
successful suits is that they or their lawyers differ from other plain-
tiffs and lawyers. We have already suggested that civil rights lawyers
may be less motivated by monetary returns and thus more willing to
pursue risky cases.10 7 Even accepting the assumption that the civil
rights plaintiff (or lawyer) is a rational profit-maximizing actor, the
market for civil rights lawyers may contain features that depart from
a model in which lawyers respond to fee signals and success rates.
Other factors, beyond the model of when a case will be filed or liti-
gated, may shape the performance of attorneys.
For example, one factor is the imperfect transmission of infor-
mation about the lower success rates of such actions to the lawyers
bringing constitutional tort actions. If the lawyers do not know that
they are less likely to succeed in a constitutional tort action, they
cannot adjust their decisions to file constitutional tort actions ac-
cordingly. Alternatively, civil rights lawyers may acquire accurate
information about lower success rates but be unable to act on it.
Assuming that there are different levels of competence in the bar,
weaker lawyers ought to have lower success rates regardless of the
field in which they specialize.
C. The Government as Defendant
A constitutional tort case is either a section 1983 case (a suit
against a state or local government or officer alleging a deprivation
of constitutional or some statutory rights) or a Bivens case (a suit
against the federal government or officer alleging a deprivation of
constitutional rights). 08 Thus, by definition, the government or its
officials are the defendants in constitutional tort cases. One hypoth-
esis to explain lower success rates of constitutional tort plaintiffs is
that a private person suing the government is in a weaker position
than a private person suing another private person. This explana-
tion has promise because the government has proven to be a more
formidable litigator than private parties in other contexts.1 09
106 This assumes that the decline in settling weak cases does not offset the increase
in the success rate at trial from filing additional strong cases. See supra note 99.
107 See supra text accompanying note 92.
108 See supra note 1.
109 See Coffee, supra note 90, at 698-99; Priest & Klein, supra note 27, at 52-53 (com-
paring results of Baxter's study of private antitrust action with Posner's study of govern-
ment antitrust actions and noting higher government success rate on similar legal
issues); Wheeler, Cartwright, Kagan & Friedman, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? Winning
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Although those contexts differ from the civil rights context, the
common feature of a government defendant may partially explain
low success rates across a range of cases. The dispute resolution
model suggests than one would fare worse against the government
than against other defendants if predictions of expected outcomes
differ more than usual when the government is the defendant, and
differ in a way that depresses success rates. Equation (1) shows that
a plaintiff files suit only when the expected recovery exceeds the ex-
pected costs of the litigation. Equation (4) indicates that, given the
plaintiff's decision to file suit, the parties will opt for a court judg-
ment rather than a settlement when the parties' predictions of ex-
pected outcomes differ by more than their extra costs of pursuing a
court judgment. Several factors suggest that forecasting case out-
comes is more difficult than usual when the government is a
defendant.
1. Diferences in Accuracy of Assessing Claims
Plaintiffs contemplating a suit against the government may have
greater difficulty than other plaintiffs in accurately assessing the
costs of litigation. In assessing litigation costs, plaintiffs must antici-
pate defendants' responses. Such predictions may be more difficult
when the defendant is a government because governments may
have more complex settlement criteria beyond the financial gains
and losses of settlement versus trial. Governments may respond to
inputs less readily quantifiable than profit maximization. Plaintiffs
unfamiliar with the mysteries of government incentives may inaccu-
rately predict government behavior more often than they do the be-
havior of private defendants. This may lead them to misestimate
litigation costs.
Interestingly, plaintiff inaccuracy in assessing costs should not
alter filing rates. Underestimating true costs may lead the plaintiff
to file suit in a case with an expected judgment too low for filing
were the cost estimate accurate. Likewise, overestimating costs may
cause the plaintiff not to file suit in a case with a high expected judg-
ment. If, however, plaintiffs are unbiased in making errors, they will
make as many overestimates as underestimates and inaccurate esti-
mation of costs will not affect filing rates. 11 0 The average judgment,
and Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 21 LAw & Soc'y REv. 403, 418 (1987)(city
and state governments relatively successful as appellate litigants in state supreme courts
from 1870 to 1970; less clear results for small-town governments).
Other work speculates about the mechanism through which government behavior
might translate into impressive litigation performance. Posner, The Behavior of Adminis-
trative Agencies, 1 J. LEGAL SrUD. 305 (1972); Priest & Klein, supra note 27, at 53.
110 Likewise, if the errors are uncorrelated with P orJ (i.e., the size of the error is not
affected by the size of P or J), the strength of filed cases will be unaffected.
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however, will decrease because erroneous filings will lose relatively
frequently. "'
The relative ability of plaintiffs and defendants to assess claims
vill affect case results after filings. After the case is filed, the de-
fendant must assess the strength of the plaintiff's case in deciding
whether to settle or litigate. If the gap between plaintiff and defend-
ant accuracy is greater when the government is the defendant, the
model predicts more settlements and more court victories for gov-
ernment defendants than other defendants.
There is reason to believe that government defendants are un-
usually good at assessing the strength of claims against them. The
government defending a constitutional tort action may possess
greater litigation experience than other defendants. Governments
repeatedly defend lawsuits and presumably learn through experi-
ence how to fend off claims. At some levels, the government official
will do nothing but litigate a particular class of disputes. 1 2 Unless
the plaintiff, or plaintiff's attorney, in constitutional tort actions also
has an above-average amount of experience with this kind of case,
the gap between plaintiff-defendant expertise may be greater in con-
stitutional tort cases than in other kinds of litigation. 1 3
To incorporate these considerations into the model, assume
that plaintiffs and defendants in all types of cases have identical
stakes that they assess without error (i.e., Jp = Jd = J).114 Assume
further that plaintiffs and defendants differ in their estimates of
plaintiffs' likelihood of success at trial, P, which generates the possi-
bility of trial rather than settlement. With this simplification, rewrite
the decision-to-settle equation as
C - S > (PP - Pd)J. (5)
Finally, assume that because governments are more difficult to
fathom than other defendants, constitutional tort plaintiffs make
111 These predictions remain even if we assume the government defendant in consti-
tutional tort cases has equal difficulty in assessing its costs. The filing decision in our
model is made solely by the plaintiff, and the comparison is between plaintiffs in consti-
tutional tort cases and plaintiff in other cases. Even if there is no greater gap between
plaintiff and defendant accuracy of estimating costs in constitutional tort cases and other
cases, the model predicts lower average judgments from the inability of constitutional
tort plaintiffs to assess costs accurately.
112 A similar analysis might apply to certain corporate defendants.
113 Similarly, the defendant-government (or official) may have private information
about its own behavior that creates an information asymmetry between plaintiff and de-
fendant; the asymmetry in favor of the defendant may reduce the chances of settlement,
Bebchuk, supra note 82, at 409, and thereby presumably increases the chances of plaintiff
litigating to conclusion a losing case.
114 In the next section, we explore the effects of differential stakes (Jp # Jd) in con-
stitutional tort litigation.
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more errors in assessing P than do other plaintiffs.11 5 When the
plaintiff overestimates the strength of its case, equation (5) indicates
that the parties are more likely to litigate. In litigation against pri-
vate defendants, there is a countervailing effect of litigating rela-
tively strong cases when the defendant underestimates the strength
of the plaintiff's case. If the plaintiff misestimates P more when the
government is a defendant than when a private party is the defend-
ant or if the government is an unusually accurate predictor of P, this
countervailing effect is reduced in constitutional tort litigation. As a
result the parties will be more likely to settle strong cases and to
litigate weak cases than when the opposing parties are equally
skilled at assessing claims. The government defendant is better at
recognizing a strong case and so will settle for an amount the less
confident plaintiff will accept rather than risk a court judgment.
Conversely, when the case is weak the government defendant knows
this with confidence as well, and will therefore be quite willing to go
to trial, while the plaintiff, unsure whether the case is weak, will also
press for trial, and be more likely to lose.
Thus, if government defendants can predict P more accurately
than other defendants, or if constitutional tort plaintiffs face a prob-
lem in predicting government behavior not encountered in litiga-
tion against private defendants, constitutional tort plaintiffs will lose
more of the litigated cases than other plaintiffs, because the nonset-
tled constitutional tort cases will tend to be weaker than other non-
settled cases. 16
2. Different Resources and Stakes
Expected returns from litigation depend on what a party invests
in an action as well as on what it expects to gain or pay in damages.
Both the costs and the stakes may differ from the norm when the
government is the defendant. The models recognize few restric-
tions on the resources that plaintiffs or defendants are able to invest
in litigation."t 7 In cases in which the parties' resources are a factor
115 One can view P, the plaintiff's prediction of success at trial, as being based on
the true P with some error u, where u is distributed with a mean zero and some variance.
Pp = P + u. Our assumption is that u has a higher variance for constitutional tort
plaintiffs than other plaintiffs.
116 Placing great weight on different experience levels would go too far. Govern-
ments are capable of hiring modest legal talent. Ultimately, the experience differential's
role depends on knowledge of the civil rights bar and government lawyers. The thin
available evidence about the civil rights bar is discussed infra notes 174-88 and accompa-
nying text.
117 Sometimes the formal models imply that parties will spend only the minimum
amount necessary to file and appear in court. E.g., Priest & Klein, supra note 27, at 9
n.27, where they assume that parties cannot influence how the court will judge the case,
and thus parties have no incentive to spend resources on lawyers and discovery.
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(as when plaintiff or plaintiff's lawyer cannot borrow enough money
to carry the case for years) the probability of plaintiff's success be-
comes inversely related to the expenses of litigation, and becomes
zero when plaintiff or the plaintiff's lawyer cannot or will not spend
more on the action.
Perhaps in the "average" constitutional tort case the gap be-
tween the plaintiff's and the defendant's resources available for liti-
gation is wider than in other litigation. The effect of differential
resources is likely to become more apparent as the case progresses
and to be least apparent at the filing stage. If there is a wider than
usual resource gap between plaintiffs and government defendants,
plaintiffs may be less able to forecast its effect at the filing stage,
thereby leading to unusually low success rates.
On the return side of expected return, formal model analysts
explain many departures from expected patterns of litigation suc-
cess by invoking the concept of differential stakes. 118 Differential
stakes may be the transaction costs of the selection-for-litigation
world. Departures from idealized litigation models, like departures
from predictions that assume costless transacting, are quickly attrib-
uted to differential stakes the parties have in the outcome. If one
defines differential stakes broadly enough, they can explain many
departures from theoretical predictions. But at some point the ex-
planation becomes a truism. As in the case of transaction costs,
there is a danger of overworking the concept to explain away large
classes of untidy results and, perhaps more importantly, preempting
further probing for explanations." 19
Having noted possible overuse of differential stakes, we un-
abashedly invoke it as a possible explanation for the discrepancy be-
tween models' predictions for and empirical results of constitutional
tort litigation. Equal stakes for plaintiffs and defendants assume a
unique plaintiff seeking a one-time money judgment that the de-
fendant may pay without worrying about the effects on other actors.
The government, as a repeat player, may have more complex con-
118 See R. POSNER, supra note 78, § 21.5, at 525. Baxter hypothesized that widely
different success rates between plaintiffs and defendants in antitrust trials may be ex-
plained by the potentially greater cost of a loss to the defendant. Baxter, supra note 27,
at 18-21. Priest and Klein echoed this theme when they sought to explain variations
from their predicted success rate of 50% in tried cases by hypothesizing differential
stakes to the parties. Priest & Klein, supra note 27, at 24-29, 37-44, 52-54. Coffee gener-
ated a model of class actions and derivative law suits based on the assertion that they
involve inherently asymmetric stakes. Coffee, supra note 90, at 700.
119 The literature often assumes that defendants have higher stakes than plaintiffs,
and tends to give insufficient attention to the full stakes on the plaintiff's side. The
expected return to a plaintiff's attorney might include the good will and future pros-
pects that attend a successful action. In this sense, the stakes for many plaintiffs' attor-
neys transcend the immediate action.
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cerns than most other defendants about the impact of settlements
and adverse precedents. Present litigation can have varying effects
on the government's litigation future. If the government refuses to
settle a case it will lose, the case may produce a precedent on which
future plaintiffs can rely. But settling what would have been a win-
ning case will encourage other plaintiffs to bring suit. As Baxter
summarizes the matter, "the weaker [the] plaintiff's case ...the
stronger is the defendant's incentive to litigate in order to deter
similarly situated parties. As plaintiff's case grows stronger, how-
ever, the [added burden on the defendant] becomes an additional
force for settlement." 120
Differential stakes are even more likely when the plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief, a common feature of constitutional tort litigation.
Although the individual plaintiff benefits from the injunction (and
thus has an interest in the litigation), the government often has a
higher stake in the litigation because a broad injunction will force
the government to alter its dealings not only with the particular
plaintiff but also with other similarly situated persons. Thus an in-
junction may have an effect on the fisc that far exceeds the plaintiff's
stake in the lawsuit.
To incorporate the idea that the government in constitutional
tort litigation has a higher stake than the plaintiff does, we follow
Priest and Klein by assuming that in constitutional tort cases Jd > Jp
but that in other casesJd = Jp. Then, letting P = (Pp+ Pd)/2 andJ =
(Jp+Jd)/2, we can rewrite the settlement criterion of equation (5)
for constitutional tort cases as
C - S > (Pp - Pd)J + (Jp -Jd)P,. (6)
while the settlement criterion for equal-stakes cases is
C - S > (Pp - Pd)J. (6')
The criteria differ by the last term in (6). IfJd > Jp, this last
term reduces the value of the right-hand side, making settlement
more likely in unequal-stakes cases, other things being equal. The
extra impetus for settlement will be most pronounced when P is
large (i.e., when the plaintiff is likely to win). Thus, parties to a
strong constitutional tort claim are more likely to settle than parties
to other strong claims. Accordingly, of the cases reaching judg-
ment, constitutional tort plaintiffs should win a smaller percentage
of cases than plaintiffs in equal-stakes cases.
120 Baxter, supra note 27, at 20. The effect Baxter discusses is also treated in Perloff
& Rubinfeld, supra note 36, and in Noll, Comment: Settlement Incentives and Follow-on Litiga-
tion, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITGATION, supra note 36.
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To summarize, we suspect that asymmetrical stakes are more
pronounced when the government rather than a private party is the
defendant, and that the effect is strongest when the plaintiff seeks an
injunction against the government. If so, the government should be
settling a higher proportion of the filed cases, other things being
equal, and should win a higher proportion of the cases proceeding
to judgment.
3. Risk Aversion
Governments may be less risk averse than most other defend-
ants and therefore be more apt to reject a sure, moderate settlement
in favor of vindication through trial.12' Several theorists predict
that plaintiffs will fare less well when their opponents are less risk
averse than normal. 122 As Priest and Klein have noted, the formal
analysis is similar to the analysis of differential stakes. 123 A risk-
averse defendant discounts the expected value of proceeding to
trial, while a risk-neutral defendant will settle only for the actuarial
value of trial (plus trial costs). Thus, compared with other defend-
ants, a less risk-averse government has a relatively greater stake in
the dispute. As before, differential stakes lead the government to
settle more cases and win a higher proportion of cases that do not
settle.
V
TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
A. The Influence of a Pro-plaintiff Fees Statute
Are lawyers bringing constitutional tort cases because of the
fee-shifting statute? And does this affect settlement and judgment
rates? The evidence is ambiguous but three sets of comparisons in-
dicate that attorney fees play a lesser role in civil rights litigation
than one might expect. The first comparison examines information
about fee awards themselves. The second comparison focuses on
changes in filing rates and litigation rates that might be attributable
to the fees statute. The third comparison examines plaintiff settle-
ment and judgment rates as indirect measures of the effect of fee
shifting.
121 On the other hand, a government (run by politicians who dislike adverse public-
ity) may be sensitive to court findings of liability-particularly findings that the govern-
ment has violated a citizen's civil rights. This may lead the government to settle more
cases and thus to plaintiffs being relatively successful against the government. The gov-
ernment's fear of potentially wide-reaching injunctions and precedents may compound
this sensitivity.
122 E.g., Shavell, supra note 81, at 61.
123 Priest & Klein, supra note 27, at 27.
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1. Direct Tests
We first compare the prevalence of fee awards in constitutional
tort cases with fee awards in other types of cases. Our control group
of non-civil-rights cases includes cases such as simple contract and
tort claims, in which the American rule on attorney fees applies. Be-
cause constitutional tort plaintiffs are entitled to fees, one expects a
higher percentage of constitutional tort cases than of other cases to
lead to fee awards.
There is little evidence that court-mandated fee awards in civil
rights cases are higher or more frequent than in non-civil-rights
cases. Only 25 cases resulted in court-mandated fee awards in con-
stitutional tort cases. 124 The 1980-81 court records do not reflect
fee awards in a significantly higher percentage of civil rights cases
than in the control group of non-civil-rights cases. 125
The fees statute does, however, have some direct effect. There
are at least as many fee awards as there are constitutional tort cases
successfully litigated to money judgment, a trend not apparent in
the control group of cases. 126 Moreover, constitutional tort cases
do lead to fee awards in a greater percentage of successful cases than
do nonconstitutional tort cases. 127 The statute's most important di-
rect effect probably is the pressure it exerts to include fees in settle-
ment negotiations, where the fees need not necessarily be separately
stated and need not show up in court records.
2. Filing and Litigation Rate Tests
The second comparison focuses on changes in filing and litiga-
tion rates attributable to the fees statute. If the possibility of fee
awards encourages constitutional tort litigation, one would expect
civil rights filings to increase after the effective date of the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976.128 The Act, effective Oc-
tober 1, 1976, promises prevailing civil rights plaintiffs recovery of
their reasonable attorney fees. 129
Yet our earlier work reveals a general nationwide decline in civil
124 The percentages in Table IV are based on 24 nonprisoner fee awards cases and
one prisoner fee awards case.
125 Court records reveal fee awards in only about 4% of each class of cases. See supra
Table IV.
126 Id.
127 Id. (awards in 10% of successful nonprisoner civil rights cases and in about 4%
of successful cases in control group; significantly different at the .01 level).
128 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (second sentence).
129 The promise is to prevailing parties but the standard for awarding attorneys fees
to a prevailing defendant is sufficiently high, cf Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412 (1978), to warrant treating the 1976 Act as a "one-way" fee-shifting
statute.
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rights filings as a percentage of all federal civil filings.'1 0 Data over
time for the Central District of California, which include more pre-
cise data on the number of constitutional tort cases, confirm this
national trend.13 ' Thus a first stab at detecting increased filing rates
fails.
We examine filing rates more deeply by analyzing the Adminis-
trative Office national data using time periods designed to test the
impact of the 1976 Fees Act. Figure 2 graphs changes in nationwide
PERCENT CHANGE IN FILINGS
Other Civil Rights vs. All Private
15% Other Civil Rights
10% Al
10%_ All Private
0%'
Difference
-10% " .................
-15%_
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Year
Figure 2
nonprisoner civil rights filings in the Administrative Office category
that most closely corresponds to constitutional tort actions ("other
civil rights") during periods ending shortly before, and beginning
shortly after, the effective date of the Act. It compares changes in
these filings with nationwide non-civil-rights civil filings other than
those initiated by the United States. 132 The time periods are twelve-
month periods ending three months before October 1976, and
twelve-month periods beginning three months after its enactment.
The periods are chosen to avoid the effect of attorneys who knew of
the Act's imminent passage, waiting to file until after the effective
130 Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 1, at 660-70.
131 Id. at 671 & n.135.
132 We included the government-initiated cases in our earlier analysis. Id. at 666-67.
We find no major change in the result by deleting them and this does control for major
increases in certain types of litigation (student loan defaults, social security overpay-
ments) unique to the government. As to recent increases in these classes of cases, see id.
at 668 n.124.
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date of the Act, 133 and to allow the Act's existence to be absorbed by
the legal community.
The graph shows eight percent growth in "other civil rights"
filings from the period most nearly preceding the fees act (1976) to
the period most nearly following it (1977).134 In the perspective of
the growth of civil rights filings over time, however, the eight per-
cent growth rate for that period seems ordinary. Larger growth
rates occurred from 1975 to 1976, over a year before the effective
date of the Act, and from 1979 to 1980, three years after the effec-
tive date of the Act. The overall growth rate of nonprisoner civil
rights filings relative to all nongovernment filings again is nega-
tive.135 In no year did the civil rights growth rate exceed the overall
growth rate by more than nine percentage points.
Some observers would plausibly argue that the fees act's effect
should take a few years to appear.' 36 If attorneys finance cases out
of fee awards, they must win old cases before they can bring new
ones. Under this view, the fees statute would cause little immediate
effect, but substantial growth a few years after its effective date. The
data do not clearly show this.
A different comparison with overall filing trends, however,
yields an interesting result. Relative to all filings, the largest in-
crease in civil rights filings (nine percentage points) occurred from
the last period before the effective date (1976) to the first period
after the effective date of the fees act (1977). We cannot reject the
existence of any effect of the fees act on filings because of this crest
in the filing rate. A nine percentage point relative growth rate over
any significant period of years would substantially recast the federal
courts' business. If, however, change over a long period is the pre-
dicted effect of a fee-shifting statute, the available data cannot con-
firm it.
Following Professor Shavell, we hypothesize that the fees act
should increase the proportion of filed cases that are litigated.1 37
Figure 3 explores this effect by comparing the rate of litigation for
133 Courts eventually applied the Act to pending cases anyway. E.g., Corpus v. Es-
telle, 605 F.2d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 919 (1980).
134 The numbers underlying the graphs in Figures 2, 3, and 4 are contained in the
tables in Appendix B.
1.35 Note the importance of the endpoint chosen. The overall growth rates could be
made mildly positive by ending one or two years earlier.
136 The formal models do not forecast the shape of the effect of fee-shifting on filing
rates. They generally are content with forecasting only the direction of the effect.
137 See supra text accompanying notes 102-06. Litigation rates are measured in Fig-
ure 3 by examining the rate at which cases terminate by trial. An alternative measure
would include the rate at which cases are resolved by courts, and thereby include cases
resolved on motions to dismiss, summary judgment, and the like. Shavell's prediction is
in fact one based on trial rates. Shavell, supra note 81, at 56-57.
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civil rights cases, as measured by cases completed at trial, with the
rate of litigation in other actions filed by private parties. The figure
graphs the percent that end in trial of "other civil rights" termina-
tions and of all non-civil-rights terminations. It shows a decline in
litigation rates across all cases but a more substantial decline in non-
civil-rights cases than in the "other civil rights" category.
Figure 3 shows the growing gap between the percent of other
civil rights cases resolved at trial and the percent of non-civil-rights
cases resolved at trial. Some of the greatest increases in this gap
occurred a few years after the effective date of the fees act, which is
when one would expect cases filed around its effective date, and
later filed cases influenced by it, to reach trial. Moreover, since
1978 or 1979 the relationship between litigation rates has diverged.
In general, the results portrayed in Figure 3 support the prediction
of increased litigation rates.
Other figures underscore the continuous and substantial shift in
the federal trial docket. Administrative Office tapes show that in fis-
cal 1975, the "other civil rights" category accounted for 4.7% of all
federal terminations and 7.2% of all cases completed by trial. In
fiscal 1984, this category accounted for only 4.1% of all termina-
tions but for 9.0% of all cases completed by trial.' 38
3. Success Rate Tests
Subject to important simplifying assumptions, expectations
models predict that fee-shifting should increase plaintiff judgment
rates. Figure 4 graphs data bearing on fee-shifting's effect on judg-
ment rates. It shows, for private non-civil-rights cases and "other
civil rights" cases, the percentage of cases in which the plaintiff pre-
vailed after judgment minus the percentage of cases in which the
defendant prevailed after judgment. We call this the "P-D spread"
and use it to monitor plaintiffs' success over time and across classes
of cases.
The non-civil-rights line in the graph provides a baseline mea-
suring the relative success of plaintiffs and defendants in a wide
range of civil litigation. Figure 4 suggests underlying changes over
time in plaintiffs' overall success. The two lines in the graph track
the extent to which the civil rights P-D spread has changed over
time relative to underlying changes in plaintiffs' success in normal
138 Some of these figures differ in minor respects from those published by the Ad-
ministrative Office in its Annual Reports. These differences do not affect the conclu-
sions in text.
139 The Figure is limited to cases in which the Administrative Office data report a
judgment, so figures graphed are percents of cases with judgments, not percents of all
cases filed.
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litigation. ' 3 9 One can use the difference between the civil rights and
non-civil-rights P-D spreads to assess the declining fortunes of civil
rights plaintiffs.
The P-D spread is consistently negative for civil rights plaintiffs
because they consistently lose more cases ending in judgment than
they win. The spread is nearer to zero for other actions because less
difference exists between plaintiff and defendant judgment rates.
The graph shows that the plaintiff-defendant spread in court judg-
ments became sharply more negative for civil rights plaintiffs in the
two years (1977 and 1978) immediately following enactment of the
fees act, at a time when the P-D spread for non-civil-rights actions
was increasing sharply. Perhaps the divergence is attributable to
cases brought because of the fees act.' 40
On the whole, scant evidence exists to support a filing increase
attributable to the fees act. The increase in filings, if any, is detecta-
ble only when we isolate a single year and compare growth in civil
rights filings to private filings. Over the long term, even this com-
parison shows civil rights cases increasing at a slower rate. The evi-
140 The civil rights P-D spread also declined between 1975 and 1976, the last year
before Congress passed the fees statute, making uncertain the effect the fees statute had
on the decline.
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dence more strongly suggests that the fees act may have lowered
settlement rates and lowered the percentage of court judgments
favorable to plaintiffs.
4. Accounting for Changes in Law
Isolating the fees act's effect requires accounting for filings
made during different time periods. Changes in legal doctrine or
social circumstance could also contribute to changes in filing pat-
terns or fee award patterns. To take an extreme example, assume
that the Supreme Court overruled Monroe v. Pape14 1 at the same
time that the fees act was enacted. One would expect such a change
in law to conceal the effect of the fees statute, so constitutional tort
filings would not increase despite the statute's enactment.
Three kinds of intervening events are relevant: (1) events
outside the legal system, such as changes in population, police prac-
tices, or the economy; (2) changes in the interpretation of constitu-
tional tort causes of action or constitutional provisions by the
courts; and (3) statutory developments. The study assumes that
events outside the legal system did not substantially influence the
141 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Monroe generally is regarded as marking the rebirth of
§ 1983. See T. EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 86-88 (2d ed. 1987).
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number or success rate of constitutional tort filings. The analysis
proceeds on the assumption that the effects of outside events cut in
both directions and balance out, that the overall effect is de minimis,
or that the overall effect would be to increase constitutional tort fil-
ings and, therefore, not cancel out the expected effect of the fees
statute.14
2
Discussing changes in case law and statutory provisions re-
quires identifying a relevant time period during which to study pos-
sible influences. This study relied on national filing data covering
1975 to 1984. It is therefore necessary to examine changes in law
during that period.
One would expect the number of constitutional tort filings to
remain constant or to increase slightly from the mid-1970s to the
early 1980s due to case law changes directly affecting constitutional
tort cases. Two major constitutional tort cases might be expected to
increase filings. The first, Maine v. Thiboutot,143 decided during the
summer of 1980, formally opened section 1983 to causes of action
based on federal statutory claims against state officials. It was the
most significant decision affecting a plaintiff's ability to state a sec-
tion 1983 cause of action. The enormous range of federal statutes
involving state officials threatened to allow section 1983 statutory
actions to dwarf section 1983 constitutional causes of action.
Although Thiboutot's likely effect would be to increase the number of
section 1983 filings, two factors indicate that no massive shift in fil-
ings should have been expected. First, the case's broadest implica-
tions were quickly undermined by opinions in 1981 suggesting that
the availability of a section 1983 cause of action would be deter-
mined on a statute-by-statute basis.' 44 The subsequent cases also
indicated that the outcome of that determination was at least as
likely to be against finding a section 1983 cause of action as in favor
of finding one. Second, Thiboutot's implications may be most impor-
tant for cases outside the civil rights area because civil rights plain-
tiffs already had many federal statutes to invoke in federal court.145
142 The litigation model discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 88-89,
suggests that, for purposes of case-filing volume, important legal changes are those that
increase uncertainty as well as those that establish new causes of action or eliminate old
ones. We make no express effort to account for changing certainty levels in relevant
legal doctrine during the period studied but suspect that such an effort would not yield a
clear prediction of substantial filing increases or decreases.
143 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
144 Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
145 Other plaintiffs, such as federal securities plaintiffs, may have been the biggest
potential beneficiaries of Thiboutot's most far reaching implications. Plaintiffs in such
cases often may recover attorney's fees only if their cases can be brought under § 1983.
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The second case, Monell v. Department of Social Services,146 for the
first time allowed a section 1983 plaintiff to sue cities and coun-
ties. 147 This decision gave constitutional tort plaintiffs a govern-
mental deep pocket that they could name as a defendant. Monell
would not drastically increase the number of filings because the case
increased the number of possible defendants rather than the
number of possible causes of action.
With respect to defenses to constitutional tort claims, matters
are less clear. Several cases acknowledged or expanded the scope of
judicial and legislative immunity. 148 These cases might be expected
to discourage plaintiffs from bringing marginal section 1983 actions
against defendants qualifying for the expanded individual immuni-
ties. For state defendants, Quern v. Jordanl49 established that plain-
tiffs could not name states as defendants in section 1983 actions. Its
net effect is muted because, until Monell found cities amenable to
suit in 1978, nearly everyone assumed that states were immune from
section 1983 actions anyway. Perhaps Milliken v. Bradley,150 which
held that the eleventh amendment does not prevent a school deseg-
regation order from requiring the state to bear millions of dollars of
cost to assure future compliance with the Constitution, and Hutto v.
Finney,15 1 which authorized attorney fees awards against the state in
section 1983 cases, should be regarded as potentially more influen-
tial than Quern. Both cases established situations in which the sover-
Unless litigants designated these cases as civil rights .cases, they would not show up in
our later study.
One ought to add to Thiboutot the Supreme Court's expansion of the implied consti-
tutional causes of action against federal officials. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Court approved an
implied fourth amendment damages action against federal officials. During the years
covered by this study, the Court expanded Bivens to include other constitutional amend-
ments. From 1978 to 1980, three decisions indicated that civil rights actions would be
authorized against federal officials for violations of the first, fifth, and eighth amend-
ments. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (eighth amendment); Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228 (1979) (fifth amendment); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (first
amendment). Subsequently, in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), the Court con-
tracted the first amendment Bivens action available to federal employees with substantial
administrative remedies.
146 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
147 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), heightened Monell's impact
by denying cities the good faith defense available to individual state officials. Monell
offered an important defense to cities by requiring that wrongful behavior constitute
"official city policy." The net effect, however, was to increase local civil rights exposure.
148 Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979)
(expanding the legislative immunity defense); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)
(expanding judicial immunity); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (acknowledg-
ing absolute immunity of state judges, a result that was predictable from earlier cases).
149 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
150 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
151 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
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eign immunity bar would not apply. 152
Taken together, the section 1983 cases decided during the rele-
vant time period had no predictable substantial effect on the
number of filings. As a result of intervening cases it would be diffi-
cult to predict either a dramatic increase or decline in section 1983
filings. If the cases must be classified, they seem slightly favorable
to constitutional tort plaintiffs, and thus might be expected to gen-
erate a modest increase in constitutional tort litigation.
One also must take account of cases not directly interpreting
section 1983 that may influence the flow and outcome of section
1983 cases. Section 1983 merely provides a remedy for violations of
federal rights. If the underlying set of federal rights changes, the
expected number and nature of section 1983 cases also may change.
Much has been written about the Burger Court's retrenchment
on Warren Court era decisions. 153 Several opinions might be ex-
pected to reduce constitutional tort filings. Narrow constructions of
the cruel or unusual punishment clause 54 and the procedural due
process clause'55 should decrease filings. Requiring illicit intent to
establish violations of the equal protection clause' 56 discourages
some plaintiffs from filing. Restrictive criminal procedure opinions
reduce the opportunities for constitutional tort actions against the
police. 157 Finally, decisions on matters such as justiciability and
standing have not favored civil rights litigants.' 58
The period from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s was, how-
ever, not one of uniform constitutional contraction. It was also
marked by increased due process protection of family interests, 159
152 Milliken limited the Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), bar to retrospective
relief against state officials to cases in which plaintiff sought retroactive damages relief.
Courts could require states to pay the cost of future compliance with the Constitution.
153 See, e.g., THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V. Blasi
ed. 1983) [hereinafter THE BURGER COURT]; THE BURGER YEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS
IN THE SUPREME COURT 1969-1986 (H. Schwartz ed. 1987) [hereinafter THE BURGER
YEARS].
154 U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII; see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
155 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
156 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Auth., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also
Bums, The Activism is Not Affirmative, in THE BURGER YEARS, supra note 153, at 95-100.
157 E.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); United States v.Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976).
158 E.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362 (1976); see Neuborne, Justiciability, Remedies, and the Burger Court, in THE BURGER
YEARS, supra note 153, at 3-17. Professor Neuborne notes, however, that "the Burger
Court's remedial decisions did, on balance, improve the lot of plaintiffs seeking judicial
redress for violations of constitutional rights." Id. at 17.
159 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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increased scrutiny of gender discrimination 160 and of discrimination
against illegitimate children,1 6 1 and confusing signals about reme-
dies for school segregation. 162 During this period the Court created
the doctrine of commercial speech, a new possible fertile source of
litigation, without otherwise eliminating large classes of first amend-
ment cases. 163 Additionally, the Court's mixed signals about affirm-
ative action cohld not be expected to reduce litigation. 1 4
Those summing up the Burger Court's decisions have not
found a sufficiently uniform trend to warrant predicting noticeable
decreases in constitutional tort litigation. Professor Gunther has
noted the Burger Court's surprisingly modest impact on preexisting
constitutional law.' 65 Anthony Lewis, in his foreword to a major
work assessing the Burger Court, states that the most controversial
Warren Court doctrines became more secure, that no counter-
revolution occurred, and that the reach of earlier decisions on racial
equality and the first amendment were expanded. 166
Professor Kamisar in writing about criminal procedure, the area
of perhaps the greatest tension between the Burger Court and its
predecessor, has indicated that the major retrenchment occurred
prior to the period of interest here. 167 Eleanor Holmes Norton, for-
160 E.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see
Williams, Sex Discrimination: Closing the Law's Gender Gap, in THE BURGER YEARS, supra note
153, at 109-24. But see Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
161 E.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
162 E.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (Dayton 11); Colum-
bus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433
U.S. 406 (1977) (Dayton I); see The Supreme Court-1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REv. 60, 119-
30 (1979).
163 E.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See generally Cox, Fore-
word Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1980). But see the
generally critical first amendment essays by Denniston, Halperin & Zion in THE BURGER
YEARS, supra note 153.
164 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978); see Bums, supra note 156, at 95, 102-06.
165 G. Gunther, Some Reflections on the Past and Future of the Burger Court, Ad-
dress at D.C. Circuit Conf., Williamsburg, Va. 9 (May 21, 1985) (on file at Cornell Law
Review).
166 Lewis, Foreword, in THE BURGER COURT, supra note 153, at vii; cf. W.
MCI.AUCHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS 69 (1984) (discussing Supreme Court
caseload and noting that filings were down but rejecting explanation based on general
differences between Warren Court and Burger Court). The editor of another book on
the Burger Court has noted the "unexpected degree of continuity" between the Warren
and Burger Courts. Schwartz, Preface, in THE BURGER YEARS, supra note 153, at xii.
167 Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It
Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT,
supra note 153, at 62, 91; Kamisar, The "Police Practice" Phases of the Criminal Process and the
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mer chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, sum-
ming up some of the civil rights work of the Burger Court, found no
clear trend against civil rights plaintiffs. 168 During the relevant pe-
riod, in fact, significant case-law-generated contractions of civil
rights litigation probably did not occur.169
On the statutory front, Congress enacted few provisions that
might substantially reduce section 1983 constitutional tort litiga-
tion. In 1980 Congress abolished the $10,000 jurisdictional amount
limitation for federal question cases, 170 a change that could only in-
crease constitutional tort filings. The Civil Rights of Institutional-
ized Persons Act 171 may eventually impose a widespread exhaustion
of state administrative remedies requirement on state prisoners, but
during the period studied, no state had in place a remedial system
that would trigger the statute's exhaustion requirement. 72
In summary, enactment of the 1976 fees statute dominates
other statutory developments 173 and might have been expected to
dominate nonstatutory developments as well. There is no "smoking
gun" case law development that predictably would mask the effect
of a statute that would otherwise lead to increased filings. The de-
cline of constitutional tort filings relative to other civil filings after
the fees act's effective date cannot easily be explained by changes in
law. The most hopeful explanation is that government officials have
Three Phases of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER YEARS, supra note 153, at 143-68 (sug-
gesting an increasingly pro-police Burger Court after 1981).
With respect to the Burger Court's treatment of prisoners Professor Schwartz finds
the record to be "much good, much bad, and on balance, probably beneficial."
Schwartz, The Burger Court and the Prisoner, in THE BURGER YEARS, supra note 153, at 177-
88.
168 She stated, for example: "Contrary to predictions, the Burger Court will be
remembered as the judicial architects of a strong and broad interpretation of employ-
ment discrimination statutes." E. Norton, Association of American Law Schools, Work-
shop on Teaching Civil Rights (Sept. 27, 1986) (on file at Cornell Law Review). She did
suggest that, after 1976, employment discrimination plaintiffs were on the defensive in
the Supreme Court. But, even here, she noted that the most important test, affirmative
action, survived even in the late Burger Court period. Id
169 See also Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsek Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead
End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 17 (1986) (by the late 1970s, the Court was taking a "some-
what less expansive approach to the right to counsel than one might have extrapolated
from... the Warren era" but the basic right remained firmly established).
Those institutional plaintiffs with the luxury of choosing when and where to sue
may have been influenced by the generally more conservative Court.
170 Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1982)).
171 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997j (1982).
172 And such a system would have no effect on nonprisoner civil rights filings.
173 Another statutory development worth noting is enactment of the Equal Access to
Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, §§ 203-04, 94 Stat. 2321 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 504 (1982)), amended and extended by Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (1985) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. IV 1986)).
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improved their compliance with the Constitution or are more ame-
nable to nonlitigation dispute resolution.
B. The Civil Rights Bar
Differences between constitutional tort lawyers and other law-
yers may partly explain why constitutional tort litigation differs from
other litigation. Constitutional tort lawyers may use different filing
criteria, have different abilities, and pursue cases to trial for differ-
ent reasons than other lawyers. Systematic data about constitutional
tort lawyers do not exist, and it is doubtful that there is a distinct
"constitutional tort" bar174 in the sense that there is a securities law
bar, a tax bar, or a plaintiff's tort bar. The most detailed study to
date of any major bar shows little in the way of a civil rights bar. 175
Given the lack of information about the "civil rights bar," our
discussion is by necessity constrained to hypotheses and more lim-
ited data. Based on the identity of the lawyers filing the actions in
the field study, we hypothesize that the constitutional tort bar has
four components: (1) visible institutional actors such as the Legal
Defense Fund or the American Civil Liberties Union, (2) typical law-
yers of the kind that bring most cases of all kinds, (3) occasional
players such as major law firms engaging in pro bono activity, and
(4) government lawyers working in legal services offices. 176
Some explanations of how the constitutional tort bar differs
from other bars depend on which component of the constitutional
tort bar one examines. Explanations that rely on different experi-
ence ring hollow when referring to an institutional actor or an attor-
ney that is part of a legal services office. 177 Explanations that rely on
different resources seem implausible when focusing on large firm
pro bono activity or government lawyers. Experience- and re-
source-based explanations probably are more helpful when ad-
dressed to the general bar.
It is likely, however, that the institutional civil rights litigator,
174 Unless bringing a constitutional tort case, standing alone, qualifies one for mem-
bership in such a bar, the approach taken by a study of civil rights litigation in the
Supreme Court. J. CASPER, WARREN COURT, supra note 92; Casper, Lawyers Before the
Supreme Court: Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, 1957-66, 22 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1970) (noting
dominance of NAACP Legal Defense Fund in civil rights litigation before Supreme
Court).
175 J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR
(1982). Although expanding the category further to include all "public interest" lawyers
makes more data available, little of it relates to constitutional tort activity.
176 Cf R. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 44-48 (1985) (discussing lawyers who bring test cases on behalf of
children).
177 If anything, the Legal Defense Fund and the ACLU would seem to have an edge
over typical government attorneys.
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the major-law-firm pro bono case, and the government-funded legal
services case are the exceptions rather than the rule. These seg-
ments of the bar may dominate the important test cases, but one
theme in the literature that our data confirm is that most civil rights
litigation is not brought by institutional litigators or by large firms
engaging in pro bono activity.178 Even a leading institutional litiga-
tor that might be expected to bring constitutional tort actions could
afford to bring at most a handful of cases in a single district in one
year, 179 and only some of those cases would be constitutional tort
cases.' S0 More importantly, the institutional litigators tend to favor
important test cases rather than servicing the population at large so
that they can maximize the impact of their resources and efforts. 181
On the pro bono front, the slim available evidence suggests that less
activity exists than one might assume.18 2 The Heinz and Laumann
Chicago bar study states:
While some elite lawyers may devote small amounts of their time
to civil rights law, however, the data on the 14 lawyers in our sam-
ple who devote 25 percent or more of their time to work that they
label "civil rights" suggest that [the assumption of elite lawyer
participation in civil rights matters] should be examined.' 83
If the nature of the bar does help explain success rates, the relevant.
178 Even at the Supreme Court level the bulk of civil rights litigation is by small
private law firms and solo practitioners. J. Casper, Ph.D. thesis, supra note 92, at 207.
179 Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV.
207, 248 n.132 (1976) (in 1975 Legal Defense Fund had an active docket of 200 employ-
ment discrimination cases). Rabin notes that other institutional public interest liti-
gators, including the NAACP, the Legal Action Center of New York City, Public
Advocates, the Center for Law in the Public Interest, MALDEF, and the Women's Law
Fund, handle much smaller caseloads of title VII and related cases. Id. Mnookin reports
a 1980 survey showing only one lawyer in 500 to be in public interest law centers. R.
MNOOIUN, supra note 176, at 45. The ACLU's impact is harder to assess because of its
thousands of local affiliates. Rabin reports that by 1974, "Five thousand volunteer attor-
neys supplemented a litigation staff that included 34 full-time staff attorneys in 19 local
offices and 18 lawyers in the ACLU national office." Rabin, supra, at 212. See generally S.
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLIrICs OF RITurs: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE
194-97 (1974) (discussing bleak financing prospects of the activist bar).
180 The Legal Defense Fund, for example, expends much of its time and funds on
title VII litigation, death penalty litigation, and defending affirmative action programs.
R. MNOOKIN, supra note 176, at 46-47; see also Rabin, supra note 179, at 217-18. Of these
classes of cases, only title VII cases against government defendants might generate many
constitutional tort cases, without necessarily generating many cases in one district.
181 R. MNOOKIN, supra note 176, at 46-48 (noting the orientation of public interest
litigators, including the ACLU, the Legal Defense Fund, and the Legal Services Pro-
gram, toward large test cases).
182 Some perceive civil rights litigation as being conducted primarily by corporate
lawyers from large, prestigious firms. J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, supra note 175, at 78-79
n. 18 (noting and questioning the perception); Corbin, Democracy and Education for the Bar,
4 AM. L. SCH. REv. 725, 732 (1922).
183 J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, supra note 175, at 79 n.18. The distribution of civil
rights lawyers by practice area was as follows:
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bar is the local, small-firm lawyer who brings the bulk of constitu-
tional tort litigation.184
Perhaps constitutional tort cases are brought by less skilled or
experienced attorneys than other cases. For a young, untrained at-
torney, a constitutional tort case may be tempting ground on which
to gain valuable experience, regardless of expected outcome. How-
ever, the Chicago bar study poses difficulties for this theory.
Although Heinz and Laumann found that the civil rights practi-
tioner had a low mean age relative to practitioners in other areas of
law, this was not a statistically significant difference.' 8 5 Other areas
with low mean ages included antitrust defense and business tax, spe-
cialties not usually associated with lawyers of undeveloped skills.' 8 6
The most statistically significant fact about the civil rights practition-
ers was their extraordinarily high connection to elite law schools.
Only antitrust and securities lawyers had a greater percentage of
practitioners from the elite group.' 8 7 In terms of how their peers
perceive them, the civil rights lawyers were regarded as
"average." 88
Another explanation for the lower success rates of constitu-
tional tort cases might be that constitutional tort lawyers are less
"success oriented" than other lawyers in accepting cases. Although
government lawyers 50%
practitioners in firms of < 10 lawyers 29%.
practitioners in firms of > 30 lawyers 13%.
corporate law departments 7%
solo practitioners 0%.
Id at 443 table B.3. Because of the small number of civil rights practitioners found, the
authors properly caution against drawing conclusions from these data.
184 Matters may change at the Supreme Court level. SeeJ. Casper, Ph.D. thesis, supra
note 92, at 499 (noting dominance of NAACP Legal Defense Fund in civil rights litiga-
tion before Supreme Court).
185 J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, supra note 175, at 446-49 table B.5.
186 Id And in these two areas the relatively low mean age was statistically
significant.
187 Id. at 444-45 table B.4. The elite schools were defined to be Chicago, Columbia,
Harvard, Michigan, Stanford, and Yale. Id at 445 table B.4 (note 2). Casper's data
show that civil rights litigators at the Supreme Court level had slightly higher attendance
rates at elite colleges and had more frequently appeared in the top 10% of their college
class than had other Supreme Court litigators. J. Casper, Ph.D. thesis, supra note 92, at
204. They show the civil rights litigator to have attended full-time law schools at about
the same rate as the other litigators, and to have performed almost exactly as well in law
school. Id at 206. There were substantial differences between firm size and income. Id
at 207-08.
188 On a scale where the mean "prestige score" was 50, the civil rights bar was per-
ceived by a random sample of 224 attorneys to have a prestige score of 46. This was .4
standard deviation units below the mean. J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, supra note 175, at 91
table 4.1. The prestige score was arrived at by asking the lawyers to rate, on a 5-point
scale, the "general prestige within the profession at large" each of 30 fields of law. Id at
90.
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we have no direct evidence on this, process of elimination suggests
that this is a promising explanation worthy of further study.
C. Attorney Fees and Prisoner Civil Rights Cases
Much of the prior analysis either focused on nonprisoner con-
stitutional tort actions or disregarded differences between prisoner
and nonprisoner actions. Yet important differences exist between
these two classes of constitutional tort actions. Both their measura-
ble characteristics and the likely role of attorneys may shift when
one moves from nonprisoner to prisoner litigation. Attorneys' im-
pact on prisoner cases may differ from their influence in non-
prisoner cases. Prisoners encounter practical hurdles to finding a
lawyer and preparing a case while in jail. Prisoners are less able
than others to pay lawyers. Whether or not they can obtain lawyers,
prisoners have little incentive not to file actions.
Judges may be more dissatisfied with prisoner civil rights litiga-
tion than with nonprisoner civil rights litigation. Prisoner civil
rights is one area where the vision of large numbers of frivolous
actions is strongest. Perhaps as a result of this perception, the one
formal exhaustion-of-remedies requirement in section 1983 actions
applies only to prisoners.' 89
At one level, the data show a reduced role for attorneys and
support dissatisfaction with prisoner litigation. Nationally, although
prisoners bring about as many constitutional tort actions as non-
prisoners do, 190 a much higher fraction of the prisoners' cases are
unsuccessful, and counsel bring relatively few of the actions.191
Prisoners also obtain fewer money judgments, money settlements,
and attorney fee awards. 192 Although the data seemingly confirm
entrenched notions about prisoner litigation, there is more to the
story about the role of counsel.
1. The Effect of Counsel
When one controls for the presence of counsel in prisoner civil
rights cases, findings change dramatically. Table X compares pris-
oner and nonprisoner constitutional tort litigation in cases in which
the plaintiff is represented by counsel. Excluding the uncounseled
prisoner actions eliminates significant differences between success
rates, the rates at which pretrial conferences, depositions, and trials
occur, and the rates at which plaintiffs obtain money judgments and
money settlements. The significant or near-significant differences
189 42 U.S.C. § 1997-1997j (1982).
190 Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 1, at 662 table V.
191 See supra Table IV; Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 1, at 681 table XII, 692 n.207.
192 See supra Table IV.
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that remain suggest no clear picture. Nonprisoner cases result in
more hearings but prisoner cases have more active discovery
through interrogatories and production of documents. Controlling
for counsel suggests a radically different relationship between pris-
oner and nonprisoner constitutional tort litigation. As measured by
the characteristics tracked here, they become almost indis-
tinguishable.
TABLE X
COMPARISON OF COUNSELED PRISONER & NONPRISONER
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CASES, 3 DISTRICTS, 1980-81
Case Characteristics
Success
Answer
Interrogatories
Hearing
Pretrial conference
Depositions
Trial commenced
Production of documents
Discovery event
Money judgment
Money settlement
Fees awarded by court
TOTAL CASES
Nonprisoner
244 55%
342 77%
186 42%
173 39%
152 34%
209 47%
76 17%
112 25%
258 58%
12 3%
20 4%
24 5%
Prisoner Signif. 19 3
63 52% .661
06 87% .014
71 59% .014
26 22% <.001
47 38% .395
56 46% .975
23 19% .719
42 34% .048
83 68% .044
5 4% .603
5 4% 1.000
1 2% .055
445 100% 121 100%
The implications of these findings depend on whether the meri-
torious cases find their way to counsel. If they do, it matters little
that large numbers of unsuccessful prisoner cases remain. They can
still be viewed as the nuisances they are presumed to be. If, how-
ever, many prisoners with valil claims lack representation, then the
finding of indistinguishability between counseled cases suggests a
problem in securing counsel for prisoners. Our data can partially
test whether valid prisoner claims fail to succeed for want of
counsel.
2. Judge Posner's Theory of the Market
Judge Posner argues that no problem exists because the market
for attorneys works at thejailhouse door and valid claims will attract
counsel. In McKeever v. Israel 1 94 Judge Posner argued against ap-
pointment of counsel in prisoner section 1983 cases. His argument,
193 For an explanation of the significance column, see supra note 52.
194 689 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting).
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repeated or alluded to in subsequent opinions,1 95 is that the private
market system of allocating attorneys ought to determine which
prisoner section 1983 plaintiffs obtain counsel. Those prisoners
with meritorious claims should be able to find counsel because pri-
vate counsel will be attracted by the prospect of the fee award prom-
ised by section 1988.196
The results reported above bear on Judge Posner's perceptions
about prisoner section 1983 litigation. First, little evidence sup-
ports the assumption that the rates at which plaintiffs receive court-
awarded fees in section 1983 litigation exceed those in other litiga-
tion. Section 1983 plaintiffs receive court-awarded fees in five per-
cent of the nonprisoner cases and in almost none of the prisoner
cases. Non-civil-rights plaintiffs receive such fees in four percent of
cases. There is no significant difference between the nonprisoner
constitutional tort figure and the control group figure. Second, only
sketchy evidence exists that enactment of the fee award statute in-
duced attorneys to bring more prisoner section 1983 actions. 197
One of the studied districts, the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, had an active program of appointing counsel in prisoner
civil rights cases, so we were able to explore the matter more di-
rectly.198 Neither the Central District of California nor the North-
ern District of Georgia had such a program. California and Georgia
195 Lenard v. Argento, 808 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1987); Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d
761 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983).
196 Where damages are sought, the prisoner should have no difficulty finding
a lawyer willing to take his case on a contingent-fee basis, provided the
case has some merit. Even if only injunctive relief is sought, he should be
able to retain counsel to assist him with a claim having substantial merit,
because 42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows the court to award the winning party in a
civil rights case a reasonable attorney's fee, and the award is made as a
matter of course when the plaintiff is the winner.
... Encouraging the use of retained counsel thus provides a market
test of the merits of the prisoner's claim. If it is a meritorious claim there
will be money in it for a lawyer; if it is not it ought not to be forced on
some hapless unpaid lawyer.
689 F.2d at 1324-25 (Posner, J., dissenting).
197 See supra text accompanying notes 128-36.
198 The program began in 1977. Periodic reports to the Clerk of the Court show the
number of participating firms, the number of participating attorneys (in the earlier re-
ports), and the cumulative number of cases in which counsel was appointed:
Individual
Date of Report Attorneys Firms N of Cases
8/26/77 67 24 26
6/15/78 58 20 91
11/4/80 - 17 243
7/28/81 - 32 322
5/3/82 - 29 388
4/12/84 - 26 483
Plaintiff's counsel in these cases can apply for fees although few seem to avail them-
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are districts in which we assume the private market, as influenced by
section 1988's fee provision, determined which prisoners would olb-
tain lawyers. Table XI shows that, in California in 1980-81, 6 of 73
(8.2%) prisoner constitutional tort cases had counsel. Similarly, in
Georgia,19 9 prisoners obtained counsel in 33 of 292 (11.3%) consti-
tutional tort cases filed. In Pennsylvania, interference with the mar-
ket led to counsel's participation in 82 of 253 (32.4%) constitutional
tort cases. Sixty-six of the Pennsylvania cases involved appointed
counsel. The differences between the Pennsylvania figures and
those from California and Georgia are highly significant.200
TABLE XI
COMPARISON OF PRISONER CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CASES,
3 DISTRICTS, 1980-81
C.D. Cal. E.D. Pa. N.D. Ga.
Prisoner cases with counsel 6 82 33
% prisoner cases with counsel 8.2% 32.4% 11.3%
Total prisoner cases 73 253 292
Success rate counseled cases 33% 55% 49%
Success rate appointed cases N/A 58% 50%
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania's greater willingness to ap-
point counsel might explain the differences in rates of representa-
tion. If it were appointing counsel willy nilly, however, one would
expect success rates in Pennsylvania appointed counsel cases to be
lower than success rates in Pennsylvania retained counsel cases be-
cause the private market would be more selective about accepting
cases. For Pennsylvania to achieve its high rate of representation
for prisoners, it would have to be appointing counsel in a less meri-
torious class of cases. Yet, as Table XI suggests, the success rate in
Pennsylvania appointed counsel cases differs sharply neither from
Pennsylvania private counsel cases nor from Georgia cases. The
counsel-appointing process in Pennsylvania reasonably reproduces
the private market's success rates. The process does not result in
appointing counsel in an unusually weak set of cases, which would
depress success rates, or in an unusually strong set of cases, which
would inflate success rates.
selves of the opportunity. Reports to the Clerk of the Court, as summarized in Letter to
Theodore Eisenberg from Susan Ephron (Oct. 10, 1985) (on file at Cornell Law Review).
199 Six Georgia prisoner cases had appointed counsel.
200 If one is troubled by the relatively small number of Central District constitutional
tort cases, three-year data for the same district are also available. During a nonconsecu-
tive three-year period prisoners obtained counsel in 17 out of 293 (5.8%) constitutional
tort cases filed.
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Several other explanations for the lower number of counseled
prisoner cases in California and Georgia are possible. Perhaps the
market is working and California and Georgia prisoners have fewer
bona fide claims than their Pennsylvania counterparts. Perhaps the
Pennsylvania courts are more favorable to civil rights litigants than
the California or Georgia courts.20 1 Although one must remain
open to such explanations, a simpler explanation initially appears
more plausible. Assuming that California, Georgia, and Penn-
sylvania prisons and courts do not differ enormously, the private
legal market fails to supply counsel in California and Georgia for
many meritorious prisoner constitutional tort actions.
D. The Government as Defendant
If the government-as-defendant hypothesis is correct, a key to
understanding lower success rates or greater burden of constitu-
tional tort cases is the identity of the defendant, not the subject mat-
ter of the lawsuit. Much in our analysis of the government as
defendant, including plaintiffs' relative inability to forecast govern-
mental behavior and expenditures, does not depend on the case be-
ing a constitutional tort case. One way to test this thesis is to
compare how other suits against the government fare and how long
they take to resolve.
The Administrative Office data identify every case in which the
federal government is either a defendant or plaintiff. It is tempting
to tally up the success rates and length of time in cases in which the
government is a defendant and compare them with the success rates
and length of time in cases in which the government is not a defend-
ant. This approach, however, has major weaknesses. First, the Ad-
ministrative Office category of non-federal-government defendants
includes state government defendants. Thus one cannot be confi-
dent that the federal government defendant/other defendant di-
chotomy accurately tests the government/private defendant
hypothesis. Second, combining all cases against the government
can mislead because the government is a defendant in many social
security cases, in which plaintiffs are relatively unsuccessful. 20 2
201 In nonprisoner cases, we do find significant differences in success rates between
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the two other districts. But these differences
are not great enough (roughly 10% differences in success rates) to explain the larger
disparity in counsel rates for prisoners. The greater success rates between the E.D. Pa.
and the other districts extends to the control group of non-civil-rights cases.
202 Of cases terminated in the three districts for 1980-81, Administrative Office data
show that social security plaintiffs obtained a favorable judgment in 59 of 573 cases
(10.3%) and that the defendant obtained a favorable judgment in 214 of 573 cases
(37.3%). In three cases both parties obtained judgment. The other cases are of unkown
outcome (presumably settlements and the like). The gap between plaintiff and defend-
ant judgment rates in social security cases is much less favorable to plaintiffs than in
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Comparing tort actions filed against the federal government
with tort actions filed against other defendants is more helpful. Sev-
eral features make tort actions useful. First, tort actions against the
United States are based on the law of the state in which the tort
occurs. 20 3 They are therefore closely analogous to diversity tort ac-
tions brought in federal court against private defendants. Second,
they involve government behavior that is the same as private behav-
ior. Thus, if private-defendant tort litigation differs from govern-
ment-defendant tort litigation, the nature of the defendant may be a
major contributing factor. Third, tort actions are the class of non-
civil-rights cases most analogous to constitutional tort litigation. In-
deed, government officials often walk a fine line between constitu-
tional violations and mere torts. 204 Finally, few tort actions brought
in federal court can be against state defendants. 20 5 Therefore, the
non-U.S. defendant category cannot blur the distinction between
government-as-defendant cases and other cases by including cases
with state defendants in the comparison group.
1. Success Rates Against Government and Nongovernment
Defendants
Table XII presents the court judgments in tort actions in the
three districts. It shows that, when the government is not defend-
ing an action, plaintiffs obtain judgments in 7.1% of the cases and
defendants obtain judgments in 9.1% of the cases, a slight margin in
favor of defendants. When the United States is a defendant, the
plaintiff judgment rate climbs to 8.1% but the defendant judgment
rate climbs to 14.9%. The gap between plaintiffs and defendants
widens from two percentage points to nearly seven points. National
data over a nine-year period confirm these results. 20 6
Our field data suggest a similar trend. In tort cases in the con-
other cases. See infra Table XII. We have done the analysis including all cases in which
the federal government is listed by the Administrative Office as a defendant. It reveals a
stronger pro-government trend in outcomes.
203 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
204 In several cases the Court has refused to hold that negligence rose to the level of
a constitutional violation. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527 (1981); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
701 (1976).
205 Eleventh amendment limitations on actions against states in federal court make it
unlikely that many tort defendants in federal court will be state governments or officials.
Thus, the danger is reduced that the U.S./other defendant dichotomy does not corre-
spond to a government/nongovernment defendant categorization.
206 All federal cases terminated from 1975 through part of 1984 show plaintiffs ob-
taining judgment in 18,346 out of 194,436 (9.4%) tort cases terminated against private
defendants and plaintiffs obtaining judgment in 2,273 out of 19,177 (11.9%) tort cases
in which the U.S. was a defendant. Defendants obtainedjudgment in 20,018 (10.3%) of
the private cases and 3,880 (20.2%) of the actions against the U.S.
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trol group of non-civil-rights cases, plaintiffs succeeded in 159 of
194 (82.0%) cases brought against private defendants. In tort cases
against government defendants, plaintiffs succeeded in 11 of 17
(64.1%) cases. 20 7 And in employment discrimination cases against
government defendants plaintiffs succeeded in 93 of 201 (46.3%)
cases.
208
The trend, though not highly significant in any single compari-
son, is always in the same direction. The results suggest greater dif-
ficulty in obtaining judgments against the government, but they are
tempered by two factors. First, the bulk of the cases for which the
Administrative Office reports termination data fall into the "un-
known" category, presumably because there is no known judgment
for cases that settle. Second, with respect to the results in tort cases,
the effect in favor of government defendants may not necessarily
carry over to state and local defendants. The federal government
may be a more imposing litigator than other governments.
TABLE XII
COMPARISON OF CASE OUTCOMES IN TORT CASES BROUGHT
AGAINST U.S. WITH TORT CASES BROUGHT
AGAINST OTHER DEFENDANTS
Source: Administrative Office Data, 3 Districts, 1980-81
Non-U.S. U.S. Government
Party Obtaining Judgment Government Defendant Defendant
Plaintiff 203 25
7.1% 8.1%
Defendant 258 46
9.1% 14.9%
Both 12 1
.4% .3%
Unknown 2368 236
83.4% 76.6%
Chi-Square significance = .017
2. Litigation Rates and Valuing Constitutional Tort Claims
The relative emphasis on injunctive relief in actions against
governments may exacerbate parties' difficulty in predicting ex-
pected litigation outcomes. If the parties have more difficulty valu-
ing constitutional tort claims than other claims, there will be a wider
207 The difference is only significant at the .132 level. For a discussion of statistical
significance, see supra note 52.
208 The difference is only significant at the .121 level.
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than usual divergence between expected returns and actual returns
from constitutional tort litigation. This would lead to higher litiga-
tion rates for constitutional tort claims, a result noted above. Two
sets of data bear on the possibly greater difficulty of valuing consti-
tutional tort claims.
First, examining the nature of the constitutional tort claims sug-
gests that a large fraction could be placed in the "difficult to value"
category. About thirty percent of the cases are due process or first
amendment claims. 20 9 Actions against the police account for an-
other thirty percent of the constitutional tort actions. 210 Some sub-
stantial fraction of these actions are claims for false arrest or loss of
liberty. Pure damages claims are probably only about fifty percent
of constitutional tort filings.
Second, both the Administrative Office data and the field data
suggest that injunctive remedies, which generally are more difficult
to value than other remedies, play a larger role in constitutional tort
litigation than in other litigation. Table XIII compares the percent-
age of successful constitutional tort cases leading to nonmonetary
relief with the percentage of successful cases in the control group
leading to such relief. It shows that 14.6% of the successful non-
prisoner constitutional tort cases yielded some nonmonetary relief
compared with only 7.4% for the control group. 211 Administrative
Office data confirm this at the national level and over time. From
1975 to 1984, in cases for which the Administrative Office data show
ajudgment, 3.7% of the "other civil rights" cases resulted in injunc-
tive relief. For the same period, the comparable figure for tort liti-
gation was well under one percent.
Part of the explanation for lower success rates in constitutional
tort actions may rest with the nature of the defendant, and be, to
this extent, independent of the subject matter of the case. 21 2 Fur-
209 See supra Table V.
210 Id.
211 Similar figures emerge if one examines successful prisoner cases.
212 This conclusion rests partly on the differences in success rates between tort ac-
tions brought against government defendants and tort actions brought against
nongovernment defendants. Although similar, they remain separable groups of cases.
Because they are distinct groups, different criteria for filing an action may apply to them.
At the extreme, some factor applicable to only one group of cases may distort the suc-
cess rates. The readily identifiable differences that might influence the decision to file,
however, do not clearly point to substantially different success rates for the two groups.
But the differences ought to be noted.
First, tort actions brought against private defendants in federal court consist largely
of diversity cases. Some of the factors that lead to a tort filing in federal rather than state
court may bias the sample of private actions. Second, the defenses available under the
Federal Tort Claims Act may differ from those available under state tort law. See 28
U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982) (discretionary act defense to FTCA action); id. § 2680(h) (no
cause of action for some torts); Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir.), cert.
1988]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
TABLE XIII
COMPARISON OF NONMONETARY RELIEF RATES
SUCCESSFUL CASES, 3 DISTRICTS, 1980-81
Constitutional Control Group
Tort (weighted)
No Nonmonetary 215 510
Relief 85.3% 92.6%
Nonmonetary 37 41
Relief 14.6% 7.4%
TOTAL 252 551
Chi-Square significance = .002
ther study of the effect at the state and local level is necessary. The
magnitude of any government-as-defendant effect found here, how-
ever, is insufficient to explain much of the difference in success
rates. Higher litigation rates in constitutional tort cases may stem in
part from the larger-than-normal proportion of difficult-to-value
claims.
3. Burden of Government Defendant Cases Compared with
Nongovernment Defendant Cases
Comparisons similar to those used to test factors influencing
success can also be used to test whether the government as defend-
ant partially explains the added burden of nonprisoner constitu-
tional tort cases. The results of these comparisons are mixed.
Table XIV shows that in our sample of tort cases against gov-
ernment and nongovernment defendants, the mean time to disposi-
tion for cases in which the government was a defendant was 12.3
months, while tort cases against private defendants had a mean dis-
position time of 13.8 months. This suggests that the nature of the
defendant does not help explain the greater time burden of consti-
tutional tort cases. Administrative Office data confirm that this is a
long-term national trend. 213
When comparing employment discrimination cases against gov-
ernment and nongovernment defendants, however, the results
denied, 439 U.S. 1003 (1978) (question of good faith defense for U.S. when its officials
act in good faith). Third, people seem to be less likely to file a complaint against the
government than against some other defendants. Trubek, supra note 27, at 87 table 1.
This, one suspects, would lead to greater rather than lower success rates in actions
against the government.
213 In every year from 1976 to 1983 the median time for tort cases terminated
against the U.S. was less than the median time for tort cases terminated against private
defendants. In four of the years, the survival patterns were statistically significantly
shorter.
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TABLE XIV
TIME TO DISPOSITION IN MONTHS GOVERNMENT AND
NONGOVERNMENT CASES, 3 DISTRICTS, 1980-81
Tort Cases Employment Cases
Gov't Defend. Private Defend. Gov't Defend. Private Defend.
Mean 12.3 13.8 17.5 13.9
Median 8.7 11.8 13.6 11.2
Standard Dev. 9.9 10.0 12.8 10.7
change. Table XIV shows that in employment discrimination cases
the mean time to disposition against government defendants was
17.5 months compared with 13.9 months for private defendants.2 14
Thus, in general, tort cases against the government end more
quickly than cases against private defendants. In employment dis-
crimination litigation, however, the reverse is true. This suggests
that the government may litigate civil rights cases differently than it
litigates other cases. Perhaps the government more firmly resists
civil rights claims than other claims.
CONCLUSION
These findings suggest several conclusions regarding constitu-
tional tort litigation. First, with respect to the burden of constitu-
tional tort litigation, this study uncovered little evidence that the
number of constitutional tort cases should be a cause for special
concern. Constitutional tort filings are not growing rapidly in rela-
tion to the rest of the federal docket. If there has been a constitu-
tional tort litigation explosion, it seems to be part of a larger, and
also debatable, 215 litigation explosion. Under some views of the
numbers, constitutional tort litigation declined during a period
when it was widely perceived as growing. The average nonprisoner
constitutional tort case, however, does take up more court and law-
yer energy than the average civil case, and such cases comprise an
increasing percentage of the cases tried in federal court. In con-
trast, the average prisoner constitutional tort case takes up consider-
ably less energy than the average civil case.
This study does not fully account for the fiscal consequences of
constitutional tort cases. Direct transfers of funds as a result of con-
stitutional tort actions do not seem to be an alarming phenomenon.
Relative to other measures of government expenditures, the direct
costs of constitutional tort litigation appear modest.
214 Six cases against government defendants and two cases against private defend-
ants remained pending in August 1986, over five years after filing.
215 See Galanter, supra note 32.
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Second, constitutional tort cases, both nonprisoner and pris-
oner, are a relatively unsuccessful class of cases. A smaller propor-
tion of cases settle, and plaintiffs win a smaller proportion of court
judgments. Some portion of the higher failure rate is attributable to
the nature of the defendant, the government. There is also modest
evidence that the 1976 fee award statute led to a decline in success
rates, and an increase in litigation rates, relative to other civil ac-
tions. Surprisingly, there is little evidence that the fees statute led
to significantly increased filings or to increased access for prisoners
to the private attorney market.
These last findings suggest that attorney fees statutes may have
less of an effect on filing rates than is commonly believed. In the
area of prisoner litigation, whatever effect the fees statute has had
seems to pale in comparison with the effect of the Pennsylvania ap-
pointed counsel program.
This study also suggests some strengths and shortcomings of
litigation models. The models firmly predict an increase in filings as
the result of a fee-shifting statute. Yet of all the effects of the fees
statute, the evidence provides the least support for this predicted
increase. There is evidence supporting predictions with respect to
the effect of the fees statute on litigation rates. Even here, however,
critical simplifying assumptions are necessary and the models neces-
sarily lack quantitative predictive power. The models predict the di-
rection of changes not the magnitude. When presented with
ambiguous real-world evidence, it may be too easy to detect support
for such general predictions.
The findings suggest at least two interesting areas for future
research. First, before concluding that one-way fee shifting statutes
have less effect than is commonly believed, one should study the
effect of other fees statutes on filing rates. Second, models of litiga-
tion might be expanded to accommodate the agency problems that
affect the attorney-client relationship. 21 6 If fee-shifting statutes
have less than the expected effects, it may be due to differences be-
tween the attorney-client as an entity and the attorney and client as
distinct entities.
The picture of constitutional tort litigation suggested by this
study has important implications for policymakers. Absent more ev-
idence about the relative burden and ideal level of constitutional
tort litigation, this study could not support new legislative or judi-
cial restrictions on constitutional tort litigation in the name of re-
216 See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 90; Coffee, supra note 90; Miller, supra note
90. For a study of the effect of hourly versus contingent fees on lawyer effort, see
Kritzer, Felstiner, Sarat & Trubek, The Impact of Fee Arrangement on Lawyer Effort, 19 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 251 (1985).
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ducing the federal docket or decreasing the fiscal drain on state and
local defendants.
This study also suggests the need to reassess whether the cur-
rent system of constitutional remedies is working. The low success
rates and surprisingly low number of true constitutional tort cases
may be evidence of increased official compliance with constitutional
norms. But it may also be evidence of a marginally effective system
in which many valid claims go unremedied. Without some sense of
the number and seriousness of constitutional disputes not being
filed, no clear interpretation of the evidence can be made.
21 7
Those who think there are many valid claims without remedy
must reassess the efficacy of the existing fee mechanism to promote
constitutional remedies. Perhaps a more carefully crafted fee mech-
anism would better serve congressional goals.218 It may be that
methods employed in other fields, such as minimum amounts of
damages,219 or double or treble damages, 220 would improve the sys-
tem's overall performance.
217 See Trubek, supra note 27.
218 See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 90.
219 See Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage
Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE LJ. 447 (1978).
220 See Perloff & Rubinfeld, supra note 36 (analyzing effect of reduction of damage
multiplier in antitrust cases).
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APPENDIX A
Referring to Figure 1, we assume that cases are uniformly distributed
with respect to P and J. Before fee-shifting, the cases filed are those with
combinations of P and J that lie above the curve PJ = C (graphed in Figure
1 as J = C/P), which prescribes plaintiff's minimum expected return
before filing a case. All cases below the curve will not be brought because
the expected return (the product of J and P) is less than the expected
expenses, C. After fee-shifting, the cases filed are those with combinations
of P and J that lie above the curve PJ = C(-P) (graphed as J =
(1 -P)/P). One predicts an increase in success rates if the average value
of P after enactment of fee-shifting exceeds the average value of P before
fee-shifting.
The average value of P for cases not filed before fee-shifting Pb is the
average value of P for all cases under the curve J = fb(P) = C/P.
a a
fPfh(P)dP C fP( 1 )dP
P = 3 13 a-13
a t In(a) - ln(13)Jfh(P)dP C f (1) dP
13 13
The average value of p for cases not filed after fee-shifting is
Pb the average value of p for all cases under the curve J
fa(P) = C(1-P)/P.
{Pf,(P)dP C J.P (I-P) d
P= 3 13 (a -13) /-'(62- 13)
a a ln(a) - ln(13) - (a - 13)
f f(P)dP C f (1-P) dP
13 13
Pb> Pa for all ct and 13, where 1 > a > 3 > 0.
This establishes that, for any C, the average value of P for all cases not
brought after fee-shifting is less then the average value of P for all cases not
brought before fee-shifting. Therefore, the average value of P for cases
filed as a result of fee-shifting must be higher than the average value of P
for cases that are brought absent fee-shifting. In other words, the
probability of success, were all cases to go to trial, increases after fee-
shifting.
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APPENDIX B
Tables BI, B2, and B3 supply the numbers underlying the
graphs in Figures 2, 3 and 4.
TABLE B1 (to accompany Figure 2)
NATIONAL FILINGS BEFORE AND AFTER THE 1976 FEES ACT:
NONPRISONER "OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS" FILINGS VS. PRIVATE FILINGS
Source: Administrative Office of U.S. Courts
National Filings
Other
Civil All
Year Rights Private
1975 5,294 73,790
1976 5,982 82,638
1977 6,420 81,092
1978 6,636 81,330
1979 6,778 86,098
1980 7,594 91,202
1981 8,091 97,447
1982 8,205 108,637
1983 7,894 116,585
TOTAL - CHANGE
Annual
% Increase
Other
Civil All
Rights Private
49% 58%
Difference in 7o
Annual Growth
Other Civil
Rights vs. All
Private
1
9
3
-4
6
0
-10
-11
-9%
Figure B1 shows graphically the growth in civil rights filings (possible constitutional
tort) compared with the growth in all private civil filings.
ANNUAL NUMBER OF FILINGS
OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS (00's) vs.
ALL PRIVATE (000's)
1979
Year
Other Civil Rights -- All Private
Figure 81
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TABLE B2 (to accompany Figure 3)
LITIGATION RATES BEFORE AND AFTER THE 1976 FEES ACT:
NONPRISONER "OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS" TERMINATIONS VS. NON-CIVIL
RIGHTS TERMINATIONS
Source: Administrative Office computer tapes
Other Civil
Rts. (code 440)
Change in
Difference Difference
1975 8.2% 11.2% 3.0%
1976 8.1% 11.1% 3.0%
1977 7.5% 10.2% 2.7%
1978 7.6% 10.1% 2.5%
1979 7.1% 10.0% 2.9%
1980 7.6% 10.2% 2.6%
1981 6.4% 10.3% 3.9%
1982 6.2% 10.0% 3.8%
1983 5.3% 9.3% 4.0%
1984 4.7% 9.3% 4.5%
Figures in Table are % of terminations that are completed trials.
0.2%
-9.1%
-7.2%
14.1%
-7.5%
47.5%
-3.2%
6.9%
12.9%
TABLE B3 (to accompany Figure 4)
COMPARISON OF SUCCESS RATES OF "OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS" FILINGS
WITH ALL PRIVATE FILINGS
Source: Administrative Office national data on cases reporting
judgment for plaintiff or defendant
Prevailing Party in
Civil Rights Actions
Year Plaint. Defend. P-D
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
N
(%)
17
13
11
9
9
9
8
7
6
3,960
(%)
22
25
28
31
29
26
27
25
25
12,980
Spread
- 5
-12
-17
-22
-20
-17
-19
-18
-19
Prevailing Party in
Private Actions
Plaint. Defend. P-D
(%) (%)
14 21
15 24
16 20
17 16
17 15
16 14
16 14
17 13
17 12
105,700 92,400
Spread
-7
-9
-4
1
2
2
2
4
5
Diff. in P-D Spread
Private Actions
vs. Civil Rts.
2
-3
-13
-23
-22
-19
-21
-22
-24
Year
Non-
Civil-Rts.
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